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This thesis analyzes the historical development of the Thai party system, in 
particular as far as the question of how historical legacies account for the lack of 
institutionalization of the party system. It departs from the observation about the rough 
and tumble of Thai party politics which is characterized by perplexing fights amongst 
intraparty factions, feeble party organizations, and influences of extra-parliamentary 
institutions and pressure from antiparty forces on the party system. Using a path-
dependent approach, it argues that missteps of parties in the first party system (1945-
1948) not only cleared the way for the military to return to power, leading to the 
downfall of parties, but also, and more tragically, failures of parties in that period set 
the party system on a path of poor institutionalization. The first party system emerged 
from favorable changes in domestic and international conditions by the end of World 
War II. If that party system had survived for a longer time, it could have had a chance to 
consolidate If parties had had more time to develop their organizations and social roots, 
they could have been stronger in their opposition to the military. As parties of the first 
period 1945-1948 collapsed when they were immature, they left no functional electoral 
machinery and little political reputation to their political descendants. This placed a 
huge burden on parties when elections resumed in 1969. Hastily rebuilding parties to 
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run for elections, the central party leadership had to buy affiliation of office-seekers and 
rely on them to canvass for votes in local constituencies. The vote-collecting method 
that hinged on personalistic networks and rents helped fledging parties secure 
parliamentary seats in the immediate elections but proved to be detrimental to the 
long-term development of parties and the party system. Unsuccessful collective action 
in party organization during the transitional years from 1969 to 1979 gave office-seekers 
negative perception about parties. As party membership brings little to no benefits to 
politicians, they have few interests in committing themselves to the same parties. 
Parties often evanesce after a few elections because of a loss of membership. The party 
system experiences both high startup and mortality rates; therefore, it can hardly 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
On 3 June 2011 when Prime Minister Abhisit Vejiajiva called for an election, Thais felt 
more anxious than relieved, for this election had been postponed several times because 
of serious social and political unrest. Although Thailand's two major parties – the 
Democrat Party and the Phuea Thai Party – espoused national reconciliation, it was 
doubted that this election would end smoothly, let alone serve as a solution to the 
political crisis that had dogged the country since 2006.1 The Phuea Thai Party is 
indirectly led by Thaksin Shinawatra, once Thailand's richest businessman and Prime 
Minister and currently living overseas for fear of being arrested back home on 
corruption charges. The Phuea Thai aimed to retake government from the coalition of 
military officers, privy councilors and Democrats who together had conspired against 
Thaksin in a September 2006 coup, Thailand's eighteenth since the end of the absolute 
monarchy in 1932. The Democrats, meanwhile, sought an electoral majority to form its 
own government legitimately, thereby lessening its dependence on extra-parliamentary 
forces as it did over the past two and a half years.  Electoral competition between the 
two was inevitably intense. Reconciliation was made even more impossible when one 
considers the other political players involved in this election. The Army, the Privy 
Council and conservatives held steadfast against a repeat of a Thaksin-led government. 
The existence of powerful intraparty factions further complicated the picture by their 
                                                          
1
 The crisis started with protests against the Thai Rak Thai government in 2005. It was followed by the 
coup in September 2006 to overthrow Thai Rak Thai government and nullified the earlier electoral results. 
Since then, the struggles between pro- and anti- Thaksin groups have unfolded. 
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ability to form their own parties or join whichever parties bid higher prices. This 
situation made electoral results largely dependent on the political bargains struck 
behind the scenes and thus coalitions ultimately unpredictable.  
These unresolved and delicate issues meant that the July election per se failed to 
end the sad saga that has become Thailand’s political predicament. In fact, Thai party 
politics appears unchanged despite the 2006 coup that disrupted elections and was 
deemed to have “cleaned” the party system.  In its stead, clientelistic networks 
prevailed. Political parties remained pliable. Party rules were personalized. Parties 
without platforms pursued parochial interests. Worse, unelected institutions, including 
the monarchy and the military, unofficially were at the helm.  
While Thaksin’s now defunct Thai Rak Thai party (the antecedent of Phuea Thai 
party) was alleged to be corrupt, it did transform Thailand’s party politics by centralizing 
the decision-making process within the dominant political party, creating national policy 
platforms and putting into direct contact national leaders and local voters. This 
development  augured a strong political party and with it the party system’s 
consolidation (Hewison, 2010). The Thai Rak Thai 's strength was also its Achilles heel, 
however. Its new and effective management style, which was illustrated by 
overwhelming victories in three consecutive elections,2 threatened many political elites 
                                                          
2
 In 2001, Thai Rak Thai won 248 seats (40.6% of votes and 49.6% of seats) in the 500 seat parliament. In 
2005, it gained 375 seats with 60.7% of votes. In the last election before it was ousted by the coup, Thai 
Rak Thai collected 61.1% of votes. Data provided by (BKP, 2001, 2005 and 2006), retrieved from: 
http://www.bangkokpost.com/election2001/results.html ; 
http://www.bangkokpost.com/election2005/introduction.html ; 
http://www.bangkokpost.com/election2006 on 25 May 2001. The third link about the controversial 
election in April 2006, however, had been removed, when I checked it on 9 June 2011. This also happened 
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who had vested interests in the old practices of party politics. In retrospect, while the 
Thai military and the palace circle undeniably played significant roles in the 2006 coup, 
political parties were more than just victims. Minority parties in parliament waged 
vicious campaigns against Thaksin’s government (The Nation, 11 March 2006 and 30 
April 2006).3 They cleared the way for the coup and expedited the fall of Thaksin’s 
government. Alas, with their concerted effort to bring Thaksin down, these parties 
hindered the consolidation of the party system and handcuffed the collective power of 
parties vis-à-vis other political institutions. 
The recent rough and tumble of Thai party politics poses multiple questions: why 
do political parties easily submit to the parochial interests of their leaders, the 
influences of extra-parliamentary institutions and pressure from antiparty forces? Why 
is there no interest within the system to strengthen parties and solidify its position in 
the political arena? Why, after nearly four decades of electoral democracy in Thailand, 
do parties remain feeble and the party system unstable? Put briefly, why has the party 
system been unable to institutionalize sufficiently? This thesis attempts to shed light on 
these questions by analyzing the historical roots of the poor institutionalization of the 
Thai party system.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
to the news about election in 2006 of The Nation, another popular English-language newspaper of 
Thailand. 
3
 Boycott statement today, 11 March 2006, retrieved from 
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/home/Boycott-statement-today-20002516.html on 9 June 2011 
We accept Thaksin's conditions: PAD, Democrat, 30 April 2006, retrieved from 
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/home/We-accept-Thaksin-s-conditions-PAD-Democrat-
30000944.html on 9 June 2011 
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This introductory chapter will proceed as follows.  Upon elaborating the research 
questions above by measuring the level of institutionalization of Thailand's party 
system, I present my main arguments. The third section introduces the methodologies 
used and research design that guide my analysis, while the fourth positions this thesis 
within the literature on Thai party politics and the broader scholarly debate on party 
systems in late democratizing countries. The chapter closes with a road map of the 
thesis's subsequent chapters. 
1.1 Measuring the institutionalization of the Thai party system 
Institutionalization of a party system, as defined by such leading scholars in the field as 
Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully (1995, pp. 5-6), is reflected in (1) the stability in 
rules and in interparty competition, (2) parties having stable roots in society, (3) 
elections and parties gaining legitimacy, and (4) parties having cohesive organizations 
and being autonomous from personal interests of their leaders. Evaluated against these 
standards, the institutionalization of Thailand's party system is low.  
Regarding the first two criteria, the system has yet to achieve stable patterns of 
relations among parties and between parties and society. The level of electoral 
volatility4 in Thailand is below the average of other newly democratized countries in 
Latin America and the rest of Asia where competitive elections exist (Mainwaring & 
Zoco, 2007, p. 160). Linkages between parties and voters are weak, and parties have to 
rely on vote chiefs who use their patronage with local residents to canvass votes for 
                                                          
4
 Electoral volatility is a concept used to capture the stability of a party system. is It is measured by the 
changes of vote shares that all parties in a party system experience across elections.  
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parties (Ockey, 2004, chapter 2). In contrast to the dense networks of vote chiefs, few 
parties have effective local branches. Thailand's oldest party, the Democrat Party, still 
remains unable to expand nation-wide in a country the size of the state of Texas.  
Rooted in the south, it has but a few branches north of Bangkok. Thaksin's defunct Thai 
Rak Thai once had an unimpressive number of regional offices (twelve), while older ones 
such as Chart Thai Party and Palang Dhama Party had no more than fourteen (Office of 
the Election Commission, 2007).5  
Measured against the third criterion above, parties have yet to cultivate robust 
collective identity from their members. The common use of coups to solve 
parliamentary crises and reestablish political order demonstrates that political actors 
have not recognized parties and elections as the sole, let alone desirable, means to 
constitute a democratic government. The public’s approval of anti-party politicians who 
periodically and rhetorically respond to calls for “cleaning” the party system is 
emblematic  (McCargo, 1997, pp. 114-131).  
With regard to the fourth criterion, parties maintain a “two-tier structure”--
official party leaders and real party bosses. Whereas the former represent the party’s 
image to the public, the latter lead factions and coordinate internal affairs (McCargo, 
1997, p.120). Parliamentary candidates are often financially independent of parties but 
financially dependent on faction leaders. As a result, these hopefuls tend to rally behind 
wealthy faction leaders or party financiers rather than party programs. These politicians 
                                                          
5
  Retrieved from 
http://www.ect.go.th/english/files/List%20of%20Political%20Parties%20in%20Thailand%20%2812%20No
v.%2007%29.pdf on 1 June 2011 
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join and leave parties whenever the main party financiers change their political 
alliances. 
Other studies that use a different indicator, electoral volatility, to evaluate party 
institutionalization have also reached a similar assessment to that of this thesis (see 
Croissant, 2006; Hicken & Kuhonta, 2011). According to these studies, high electoral 
volatility in Thailand indicates how unstable the Thai party system is. High turnover of 
vote shares might result from the fact that candidates and the electorate flee from one 
party to another in each election. The high turnover rates of both party members and 
vote shares proved ill-defined party identities and weak affiliations among parties, 
candidates and voters. In other words, high electoral volatility reflects the low 
institutionalization of Thailand's, party system, in comparison with other Asian countries 







Figure 1: Electoral volatility in Asia6 


























































1.2 A historical approach 
The historical development of the Thai party system that has led to the current party 
system’s lack of institutionalization is the focus of this thesis. It argues that the 
development of a party system is path-dependent. The development trajectory a party 
system follows is not predestined by social structure, but is largely contingent on prior 
choices and actions of political entrepreneurs in specific historical contexts. Political 
entrepreneurs’ decisions on how to organize and run their parties are typically 
constrained by institutional arrangements.  The latter include socio-political patterns 
and written rules. As institutionalist scholars note, institutional arrangements often 
                                                          
6
 Countries that appear twice in the ranking are where the electoral systems were disrupted. In the 
Philippines, elections were discontinued by the military regime under Marco. In Malaysia, the electoral 
system changed since 1974 with the re-demarcation of constituencies and the registration of United 
National – the dominant political coalition in Malaysia since then. In Thailand, the 1992 election marked 
the end of the coexistence between an elected parliament with an unelected prime minister. Source: 
Hicken and Kuhonta, 2011, p.11 
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develop in an evolutionary way. Pre-existing arrangements determine collective choices 
of actors who work within this framework (North, 1990). Moreover, original institutional 
features can persist and reproduce themselves. In the cases of party systems that have 
been disrupted by authoritarian interregnums like the Thai party system, it means that 
antecedent party patterns serve as the backdrop to the post-authoritarian party system. 
The parties that had existed before military leaders intervened, their organizational 
structures, their relationships with voters and the patterns of their competition 
significantly shape the party system upon military withdrawal.  
More specifically, I contend that the current lack of institutionalization of the 
Thai system has resulted from historical processes that can be traced to the first party 
system that existed briefly from 1945 to 1948. The failures of parties in this critical 
period in large part set the country's party system on a path marked by the lack of 
institutionalization. 
My argument will be elaborated in two steps by using the historical process 
tracing method. I first identify the factors that account for success or failure of party 
formation at critical junctures. As conceptualized by David and Ruth Collier, critical 
junctures are periods of significant changes when opportunities open for important 
decisions or actions that will leave legacies for the following periods (Collier & Collier, 
2008 (c.2002), pp. 29-32). The courses of actions in subsequent critical junctures are 
both shaped by existing socio-political conditions that result from preceding critical 
junctures and contingent on decisions of actors in those specific points of time. In the 
9 
 
history of the Thai party system, the initial critical juncture occurred when the party 
system first emerged (1945-1948) following World War II; the second transpired when 
competitive elections were reintroduced in 1973 after a long period of authoritarian 
rule. In the second step, I seek to specify the causal mechanisms that link these critical 
junctures, analyze how party patterns in the first party system restricted choices of 
political entrepreneurs in the second critical juncture and how consequentially they 
resulted in similar patterns of party politics subsequently.  
1.3 Notes on methodology and research design 
To explicate the historical argument set above, I adopt process-tracing and 
counterfactual methods. My methodological choices rest upon two theoretical 
considerations – one related to analyzing social systems, the other to explaining 
historical events.  
As Robert Jervis notes (Jervis, 1997, pp. 12-17 and 29-44), when the question of 
interest is the system and its emergent properties, we cannot use conventional 
comparative methods to test propositions. We cannot understand the meanings and 
impacts of factors, if we separate them from the system in which they are embedded. 
We cannot hold factors constant across time and space to compare. This thesis adopts 
the process-tracing method, since it focuses on emergent properties of the whole party 
system and emphasizes the path rather than the factors. This method will help set forth 




Another point is the unit of analysis in a system. This thesis attempts to explain 
the lack of institutionalization of the Thai party system; its dependent variable is thus 
the system. Nevertheless, the analysis is mostly concerned with parties, including their 
organizations, their support bases and their behavior, that is, units comprising the 
system. The focal point is especially intra and inter-party interactions. Once units start 
interacting, interconnections emerge; they are no longer standalone units, but parts of a 
whole. Moreover, when units interact, they change each other and their 
interconnections (Jervis, 1997, pp. 17-27). Accordingly, the system undergoes change. 
When any part of the system changes, other parts are affected (pp. 48-60). The 
magnitude of changes in each part would vary according to how they closely relate to 
each other. 
This systemic approach is commonly used in the literature on party politics. 
Giovanni Sartori (1976) delved deeply into party organizations, their ideologies and 
inter-party competition in order to classify the types of party systems and elucidate the 
corresponding characteristics of different party systems. As he put it, “a party system is 
precisely the system of interactions resulting from inter-party competition” (p.39).  
Another method this thesis applies is counterfactual thought experiments. At 
each particular critical juncture, I use counterfactuals to eliminate rival explanations to 
bolster my arguments. Counterfactual inferences are applicable to the analysis of causal 
contingencies and critical junctures. By altering some features of the stories other than 
socio-political structures and comparing possible outcomes with and without these 
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features, we may be able to unveil the role of particular historical events on the 
outcome (Fearon, 1991, pp. 169-195). The application of counterfactual thought 
experiment is especially suitable to analysis about critical junctures. During a critical 
juncture, political situations are often malleable, since there are a number of options 
available for political actors to choose under time pressure and with limited knowledge 
of the future impact of their decisions. This is the feature of the concept of critical 
junctures that I seek to exploit. Without manipulating the general contexts in my 
narrative, I make counterfactual inferences by comparing different outcomes as a result 
of possible choices of actors. 
1.4 Main arguments 
By applying process-tracing and counterfactual methods, I construct five main 
arguments that pertain to the two historical junctures. Chronologically, they are as 
follows: 
1. In the first critical juncture, that is, the emergence of the first 
party system, fierce interparty competition resulting from deep divides in values 
and interests between the ruling party coalition and the opposition party 
threatened the party system, rendering it vulnerable to external attacks.  
2. In November 1947, the military successfully overthrew the ruling 
party coalition owing to support from the opposition – the Democrat Party, in 
conjunction with a conducive international environment to military regimes at 
the dawn of the Cold War.  
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3. The coup’s timing amplified its impact. As it occurred in the early 
years of the party system, it devastated the latter’s development. While former 
ruling parties were unable to survive the harsh suppression of coup leaders, the 
Democrats were left intact, but they were neither strong enough to oppose the 
military nor interested in maintaining democracy.  
4. After the collapse of the military regime in 1973, the second 
critical juncture appeared, and parties reentered the political stage.  They were 
forced to compete for power nation-wide without any preexisting party 
organization and common identity. Hence, they failed to instill membership 
discipline and build long-term effective organization. 
5. Without functional parties, the party system remained 
unsustainable, and thus feeble against other powerful political institutions, 
notably the military and the monarchy. 
It should be noted that my analysis will focus mainly on the two critical junctures 
(1945-1948 and 1973-1979) and bypass much of the intervening twenty-two years. I do 
so because parties were marginalized from Thai politics during this time. While the 
military’s suppression had much to do with this, parties' roots in society were also too 
shallow for parties to withstand such suppression.  Thus, parties vanished rather than 
going underground. In all, the nature of parties and their stage of development prior to 
their demise, viz. the first critical juncture, were important to the fates of parties and 
their reemergence.  In this light, arguments four and five concern the delayed effects of 
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the breakdown of the nascent party system between 1945 and 1948, and the long-term 
consequences of political actions that catalyzed the breakdown. 
A consideration about the role of the monarchy in this process appears in the 
last argument of my thesis.  This does not mean I downplay its significance in shaping 
“Thai style democracy,” which is acknowledged widely in the literature on Thai politics. 
Rather, I would argue that, put in a chronological order, the rise of the monarchy 
occurred in parallel with the reemergence of the party system. The consolidation of 
monarchical power might be less of a cause than a consequence of a feeble party 
system. Since the abdication of King Prajadhipok in 1935, the monarchy wielded little 
political power for decades. It was Field Marshall Sarit Thanarat who in the late 1950s 
and early 1960s worked strenuously to revive the monarchy’s symbolic authority, 
through engaging King Bhumibol Adulyadej in public activities, as a way to legitimize his 
rule. Still, the monarchy secured independence and accumulated direct contacts with 
the population only when the military regime was weakened by infighting (see Handley, 
2006, Chapter 6). Elaborated in chapter Five, the King became increasingly involved in 
politics in the 1970s when there were few other organized institutions able to fill the 
political space that resulted from the breakdown of the military regime.  
1.5 A note on sources 
The evidence to substantiate my main arguments is derived from two sources. The main 
source materials were collected from the daily Bangkok Post from 1946 to 1979. 
Internationally funded and established in 1946, it was comparatively freer than local 
media, which was under the Thai government’s censorship. Hence, prior to Thailand's 
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gradual liberalization from 1969, the paper provided valuable updates and news about 
party politics and leaders.  
The use of newspaper articles as a main source of analysis is common in 
historical research, for a simple fact that historians cannot conduct interviews or carry 
out participant observation. A common way for historians to venture into the past is 
treading to the archives that includes newspapers (Franzosi, 2008, p. 439). In social 
sciences, many significant researches are built upon analysis of newspaper materials. 
Dough McAdam gathered evidence from articles in the New York Times to demonstrate how 
the American Black  organized their movements between 1955 and 1960 (McAdam, 1982, 
Appendix 1). His research findings were highly recognized and the political process model 
developed out of this empirical research has become a theoretical framework for later 
studies on social movements. Similarly, in a case study about decision-making during the 
1896 Democratic National Convention in the United States, Richard Bensel referred 
extensively to the Chicago Tribune published during 1896 which had detailed reports on 
the meetings, discussions and decisions of Democratic delegates (Bensel, 2005, pp. 27-
61).  
The use of newspapers has its shortcomings, however.  Reporters may 
overemphasize or miss some events because of their viewpoints and their limited 
knowledge of the issues. It was likely that the urban-based Bangkok Post missed out 
much of the countryside from its narratives and it tended to observe the elite groups 
more closely than the rural poor during that historical period. By using the press as the 
main source of historical evidence, therefore, the author of this thesis risks collecting 
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insufficient information to draw a complete narrative of the periods of concern. Another 
drawback, of course, is that the Bangkok Post is an English language newspaper written 
mostly by foreign correspondents.  Moreover, with insufficient language skills, I am 
unable to draw from Thai newspapers and other kinds of sources in Thai.  Hence, to 
compensate for these shortcomings, I also refer to secondary source materials from the 
research of historians7 and the biographies of notable leaders. This material thus 
complements and aims to verify the data collected from newspaper reports. 
1.6 Putting the Thai case in perspective 
This thesis seeks to achieve two objectives. First, I aim to unravel Thailand’s first party 
system, which remains understudied in the literature on Thai party politics. The latter 
tends to focus on the post-1973 period, which was inaugurated by the first ever student 
uprising to bring down military rule in Thailand. To be sure, most current parties, 
political factions and their leaders have emerged in this period. Yet, as chapter Five 
shows, the outcomes of party building since 1973 largely resulted from the institutional 
basis that the first party system had left. A thorough exploration of the first party 
system, I hope, will shed new light on our understanding of the current tribulations of 
Thai party politics. 
Second, my study is framed by a broader scholarly debate on party systems in 
late democratizing countries. The issues analyzed here, including the level of party 
system institutionalization, the formation of distinct types of parties, failed democratic 
                                                          
7
 Political scientists have done little research on the first party system.  
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transition and historical contexts, are not unique to Thailand. Although Hicken and 
Kuhonta (2011) have recently challenged the correlation between party system 
institutionalization and the quality of democracy, the long-lived proposition that 
“parties are by far the most important part of the representative structure in 
democratic societies” places the study of party system institutionalization still in the 
central concern of research about late democratizing countries (Lipset, 1960, p. 53). 
Early studies of this literature often assumed that instability was a provisional but 
common feature that most party systems passed through in their infant stage. Scholars 
thus directed their studies to designing proper electoral rules, generally based on the 
experiences of Western developed democracies, as they hoped that these “right rules” 
could help party systems in new democracies achieve the same stable structure as of 
old democracies (Converse, 1969; Sartori, 1976, 1994). 
When more countries joined the group of late democratizing countries and a 
larger number of cases were available, scholars discovered that parties may not grow 
stronger over time, while party systems can be entangled in a perplexing state of poor 
institutionalization (Mainwaring & Torcal, 2006). Gloomier was the fact that the 
dynamics of party politics during democratic transitions have been so important that if 
countries failed to consolidate their party systems in these critical years, it would be 
more difficult for them to do so as time passes.8 Research attention therefore has 
shifted from studying formal rules to analyzing historical contexts and institutional 
backdrop at the point of transition. Yet, while most studies have underscored the causal 
                                                          
8
 See a few examples from Asia, Africa, Eastern Europe and Latin America in: (Lindberg, 2007; Mainwaring 
& Zoco, 2007; Rose & Munro, 2003)  
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significance of initial historical context, they have explained little why history can have 
such a deep impact. Historically oriented, path dependent explanations typically fail to 
specify the causal mechanisms at work (Mainwaring, 1999; Thelen, 1999). By 
theoretically describing the mechanisms that sustain causal effects of pre-authoritarian 
institutions on post-authoritarian ones, and illustrating them in the Thai case, my study 
intends to add to the existing literature on party system development. 
As a single-country monograph, this thesis lacks a comparative assessment of the 
causal mechanisms. It is also limited to testing only one pathway that a party system 
may follow. Nevertheless, a case study allows close examination of a process, tracing 
step-by-step the development of a system (Hall, 2003). Therefore, by using the Thai case 
as a detailed exploration of causal impacts of the first party system on its subsequent 
development, I can preliminarily propose an analytical framework for studying party 
systems in other new democracies. Other cases are needed to verify different pathways 
of party system development, and to test the strength of this framework. Given limited 
time and funding, this thesis leaves this task for further studies. 
1.7 Organization of the thesis 
Following this introductory chapter, the second chapter will lay down the thesis's 
theoretical foundation. A brief review of common approaches in the study of party 
system institutionalization helps to explain why I choose to frame my analysis within 
historical institutionalism, particularly by emphasizing the idea of path dependency. I 
will discuss in detail related concepts including initial conditions, critical junctures and 
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feedback, and elaborate how they can be applied to the study of party systems. This is 
done especially through a comparison of main arguments in the classic work on party 
system development by Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan (1967). Although 
Lipset and Rokkan had no intention to adopt path dependency theory, their arguments 
approximate many of its fundamental ideas. Without reference to path dependency 
theory, however, they stopped short of explaining why some historical traits of party 
systems remained constant in times of change. Furthermore, based on European cases, 
their theory was less effective when applied to party systems in late democratizing 
countries. To fill these gaps, I will explicitly draw on path dependency theory to develop 
a common model of party system development that can explicate different paths party 
systems may follow. 
Chapters Three, Four and Five are the empirical core of the analysis in which the 
modeled pathways developed in chapter two will be applied. Chapter Three depicts a 
general political picture from the overthrow of Thailand’s absolute monarchy in 1932 to 
the end of World War II (WWII) in 1945, when domestic and international changes 
created favorable conditions for the first party system to emerge in 1945. Chapter Four 
analyzes the first party system and explains why it failed, while Chapter Five examines 
the continuity in the party system when elections were reintroduced in 1969, despite 
disruption by military rule. A large part of this chapter is devoted to describing the 




The concluding chapter discusses the significance of the results presented in 
chapters Three, Four and Five to the understanding of current problems in Thai party 
politics. I also highlight their implications for studies about party systems and 
institution-building in new democracies. 
20 
 
Chapter Two: Reexamining party system development and 
the Thai case 
 
This chapter aims to fill the gaps that the current literature on developing democracies 
in general and on Thailand in particular has left. Specifically, I construct an alternative 
framework for explaining the lack of institutionalization of many party systems in 
developing democracies. I contend that most studies that analyze formal rules assume 
the preexistence of parties when elections are first introduced or reintroduced, so that 
parties and party members can play according to rules and be shaped by them. My point 
of departure is that the preexistence or absence of party organizations, when 
competitive elections are reintroduced, should be regarded as a main analytical factor.  
It can trigger either negative or positive feedback, which then helps consolidate or 
destabilize party systems in countries experiencing democratic transitions. How 
different kinds of feedback mechanisms emerge and how they work will be elaborated 
further in the body of this chapter. My framework also is premised on the argument 
that organizing parties is a collective act. Thus, the feedback mechanisms relate to the 
balance of costs and benefits that politicians face when deciding to join available parties 
or form their own ones.  
This chapter will proceed as follows. It starts with a critical review of the 
literature on Thai political parties. The review especially focuses on the shortcomings of 
the institutionalist approach, and situates these analytical problems in the general 
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literature of institutionalism.  I then elaborate main concepts including initial conditions, 
adaptive expectations, coordination effects and feedback mechanisms, which I borrow 
from the literature of path dependency to develop my framework. The concern is to 
explore how different initial conditions create varied adaptive expectations and 
coordination effects that bring about contrasting feedback mechanisms and lead to 
divergent paths of party system development. The final part of this chapter discusses 
how to apply this framework to the Thai case, which provides a general orientation for 
subsequent chapters. 
2.1 Studying Thai party politics  
Research on Thai politics since the 1990s has put considerable effort into 
explaining the ineffectiveness of political parties and, more broadly, the instability of the 
country’s party system.  This body of work has put forth two main analytical views. One 
considers problems to be rooted in the way Thai society has developed over decades, 
and the other emphasizes the roles of institutions that regulate party politics. From the 
societal perspective, there are two principal variations on the explanation. A 
conventional story focuses on uneven modernization between Bangkok and the 
provinces. As a consequence of prolonged economic development, Bangkok had 
become “modern” and its voters politically conscious and supportive of value-based 
parties such as the Democrat Party. In contrast, the vast majority of the population still 
lives in the countryside. Rural voters, according to this narrative, remain ill-equipped to 
have an interest in ideology, much less an understanding of national policies and global 
developments. These simpletons are thereby easily swayed by money and defer to rural 
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authority figures on their electoral choices. Local strongmen capitalized on their 
clientelistic networks with local voters to bargain with national parties, building up their 
factions to the detriment of party organizations (cited in Anek, 1996, pp. 206-207; 
Ockey, 2004, chapter 2). Rural constituencies were unfavorable to value-driven, well 
organized parties. These arguments were indeed an extension of a popular view of the 
1970s and 1980s which often characterized Thailand’s countryside as socially backward 
and politically passive (Morell & Chai-anan, 1981, chapter 2), or as a network-like society 
unsuitable for modern political organization (Girling, 1981, chapter 1). 
Another variation gives more credence to the changing dynamics of Thai society. 
Scholars have argued that patron-based, clientelistic parties were a result of bourgeois 
electoralism, echoing the points of Benedict Anderson (Anderson, 1990, pp. 33-48). 
Given increasing campaigning costs, the bourgeoisie and its money easily dominated 
parties and elections--partly an outcome of former authoritarian regimes. While military 
governments suppressed the proletariat and the peasantry, they protected business 
interests as they benefited from their linkages with business groups, thereby creating a 
business-politics bed-fellowship. Hence, once elections were allowed, only the 
bourgeoisie could effectively participate (Handley, 1997, chapter 6; Surin & McCargo, 
1997, chapter 8). Yet, the bourgeoisie also cared little about ideologies or policies in 
pursuit of its parochial gains. Elections were just a bourgeois mechanism to gain access 
to the bureaucratic state, and parties were its vehicles to do so. Parties were 
consequentially corrupt and unstable (Baker & Phasuk, 2005, pp. 242-243). 
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Studies from the societal perspective, however, are adequate only insofar as 
they depict the problems in Thai party politics, but are insufficient in pointing out their 
causes. It is undeniable that rural voters receive money from candidates and support 
their patrons. Yet, candidates and parties rarely present voters with distinct political 
platforms; they prefer to use rents as a means to quickly approach voters. More 
importantly, rural constituents often vote for local strongmen not because they are 
obtuse and lured into short-term interests, as usually depicted. Rather, voters find these 
strongmen legitimate, because they take responsibility for the community’s well-being 
and deliver good public services, which national leaders tend to ignore and self-
proclaimed moral parties fail to do (Nishizaki, 2005). 
Furthermore, the need for capital per se is hardly a justification for a few 
wealthy personalities to control parties and elections. In developed countries where 
parties have long histories and stable organizations, they can be independent from their 
donors and discipline their members (Wattenberg & Dalton, 2000). As such, the 
problems are less likely from the characteristics of either voters or candidates, but more 
from parties which are supposed to function as connections between voters and 
candidates and from rules which govern the party system and elections.  
With this in mind, more recent studies have moved from the demand side – 
what voters and candidates look for -- to the supply side of electoral politics – that is, 
the kinds of parties that exist and the kinds of rules affecting those parties. These 
studies presented the second analytical approach. Their analyses draw the broader 
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literature about parties and elections led by Sartori (1976) and developed further by 
Gary Cox (1997). Similar to the scholarship influencing them, these studies emphasize 
formal institutions, which include electoral rules and constitutions, as explanatory 
variables for the lack of institutionalization of the Thai party system.   
Since the 1980s, electoral rules unintentionally hindered the development of 
ideological bases for parties and engendered more factionalism. Because center-
periphery and left-right cleavages are embedded in the regional divide between the 
north and south, the efforts to curb regional voting and to suppress regional tendencies 
made societal cleavages unable to express themselves in the party system (Ockey, 
2005).  
Hicken (2009) added that Thailand’s constitutional designs discouraged 
legislative candidates from coordinating across local districts for national elections, and 
gave no incentives for them to consolidate party’s labels nationwide. As a consequence, 
the party system has in an extremely large number of parties. There are compelling 
reasons, however, to be critical of institutional effects in the case of Thailand.  Most 
noticeably, the unusually high frequency of constitutional changes makes one skeptical 
about the real affects of constitutions on political parties. Since the inception of the 
constitutional monarchy in 1932, Thailand has had seventeen constitutions and 
temporary charters.  Each constitution and its corresponding institutional arrangements 
are too short-lived to implant desirable political behaviors in the political system. As 
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such, constitutions did not encourage parties to consolidate not because of their 
designs, as Hicken (2009) argues, but their transiency.  
Different from Hicken, Chambers and Croissant (2010) specifically focus on 
electoral rules rather than analyzing the whole constitutional designs. Using the 
promulgation of the 1997 Constitution as a landmark, they compared Thailand electoral 
rules before and after that time.  Pre-1997 electoral requirements, according to their 
argument, simultaneously forced small parties to merge; yet, these emerging parties 
were ineffective in restraining candidates from forming factions and switching parties. 
This led to larger but more fragile parties. An electoral rule that followed the 
implementation of the new constitution in 1997 made it more expensive for factions to 
defect from parties, and thus it helped give rise to a large party like Thai Rak Thai.  
However, there is no shortage of skeptics of this view. Debates on the impact of 
Thailand’s 1997 Constitution have noted a need for a more cautious approach in the 
analysis of formal institutions in Thailand. Studies once considered the 1997 
Constitution and the victory of Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai as evidence for the causal 
relationship between rules and parties. However, this example is too atypical to help 
infer the general features of Thai party system. The 1997 Constitution was a rare case in 
Thai politics. It would not have been passed if there had not been the 1997 financial 
crisis. Indeed, since 1992, parliament had been discussing a new constitution to replace 
the 1991 one. Yet, no parties were interested in the proposed Constitution, because it 
could give rise to a strong party which could override their free-riding and their factions’ 
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power (Case, 2001). The return of a “normal” party system and party politics after the 
2006 coup suggests a convincing reason to pay more attention to parties that write the 
rules than to rules which are supposed to drive party’s performance. 
In all, the relationship between formal institutions and political parties in 
Thailand is indeed similar to the cases of many developing democracies. In new 
democracies, as I will review in the next section, rules have not existed long enough to 
become independent from their founders and to shape the behavior of political actors. 
While I do not refute the effects of electoral rules and constitutional designs on political 
actors, I argue that in the case of Thailand, given the short life of formal rules, the 
supposed independence of explanatory variables from dependent variables cannot be 
satisfied. As the independence of the two variables --party and formal institutions—is 
not guaranteed, causal relations between formal rules and party politics may be 
spurious. Ones cannot consider that formal electoral rules as a cause of Thailand’s lack 
of an institutionalized party system.  
Moreover, the institutionalist approach leaves as many questions unanswered as 
the societal perspective does. While attempting to situate the Thai case in the broader 
literature on party system development, proponents of institutionalism overlook many 
features of Thailand politics that would make Thailand remarkably incomparable to 
most developed democracies. In the next section, I will review Lipset and Stein Rokkan’s 
arguments about societal cleavages and Gary Cox’s theory about the nationalization of 
parties, which Ockey and Hicken rely upon. This is done to demonstrate how the Thai 
27 
 
case fails to meet many assumptions of institutionalist theories, most importantly the 
assumptions about the preexistence of some degree of party organization and collective 
identity.  
2.2 Constant causes versus historical causes 
Most studies agree that the organization of parties and patterns of political 
competition result from rules of the political game. Electoral rules and constitutional 
designs affect the number of parties, their national or local orientation and whether 
central leadership prevails over party members or vice versa (Cox, 1997; Sartori, 1994). 
That said, it is also well known that the same rules can produce divergent outcomes in 
different contexts, for the simple reason that a specific set of rules does not exist alone 
to regulate exclusively political behavior.  Resulting political behaviors are contingent on 
combining or accumulative effects of various rules (Collier & Collier, 2008 (c.2002), p. 
10). Political outcomes are often unintended, and sometimes far beyond the 
expectation of rule designers (Jervis, 1997, pp. 61-67).  
The analysis of formal institutions faces another particular obstacle when applied 
to the context of late democratizing countries. Here, institution building, party 
formation and elections have almost simultaneously occurred in a short period of time. 
Even in countries where electoral rules have been prepared before authoritarian leaders 
step down, it is the political groups in power and those to-be-in-power that negotiate 
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and write the rules.9 Both situations raise suspicion about the possible effects of 
institutions on party systems. Do rules shape party politics or vice versa?  
Empirical studies of late democratizing countries have shown that those 
adopting the same electoral rules, designing similar governmental institutions and being 
at like-levels of economic development can have party systems at different degrees of 
institutionalization (see Bielasiak, 2002, pp. 189-210; Stockton, 2001, pp. 94-119). Thus, 
to understand the important features of a party system, one needs to go beyond 
analyzing characteristics and expected outcomes of formal institutions. As only one 
among many types of actors in the political space, parties work under the competition 
and influence of other actors such as interest associations, the military and bureaucracy  
(Schmitter, 1992, pp. 422-449). The strategies of party survival and the nature of party 
system are thus contingent on the evolution of the whole political system. Explanations 
need to delve into the process of how parties come into being and evolve (or disappear) 
over time. 
Lipset and Rokkan (1967) zero in on the temporal logic underlying the process of 
party system development. Their historical analysis of Western European party systems 
demonstrates that the sequence of political events shapes the nature of a party system. 
Once it has taken shape, it is, according to them, irreversible and thus sustains the long-
lasting impact of main historical events on the way the system works. The sequence that 
they imply is: (1) the establishment of parties, (2) the nationalization of parties, and (3) 
                                                          
9
 See cases about different types of transitions and how rules were made in such cases in a voluminous 
study about democratic transitions in Southern Europe and Latin America by Guillermo O’Donnell, 
Philippe Schmitter and others (O'Donnell & Schmitter, 1986).  
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the incorporation of mass voters and new parties into the system. The last phase took 
place when Western European countries granted universal suffrage, which marked the 
completion of their democratization process by the early part of the twentieth century. 
This phase also started the “freezing” process of their party systems.  
Each of these steps took place in a specific period where demand for change 
arose and opportunities for critical decisions opened. Three “crucial junctures”, as in the 
words of Lipset and Rokkan, corresponding with the three historical steps in the 
development of Western European party systems were: (1) nation-building of the elites, 
(2) democratization and (3) the large enfranchisement extending the voting right to all 
social groups (p.152). Outcomes of political events and decisions at each of these 
“crucial junctures” would leave legacies that shaped the political landscape and affected 
the choices of actors in subsequent “crucial junctures.” In the first “crucial juncture,” 
nation-building gave rise to the establishment of parliaments to check and balance the 
executive branch and was followed by the formation of parties within or outside the 
parliaments. When elections were granted to the whole national territories in the 
second “crucial juncture,” parties were already in place to expand nationwide and 
compete in national elections. In their efforts to attract members and compete for 
votes, during their expansion, these parties also incorporated major social interests that 
were politically salient at that time and built up their political identities in the process. 
This second “crucial juncture” resulted in a national party system that was structured 
along major social cleavages varied according to specific socio-economic context of a 
country. Once the political systems were opened to mass voters during the third “crucial 
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juncture,” parties had available electoral machineries to reach out to untapped 
constituents. More significantly, following enfranchisement, as elections became more 
competitive and costly, politicians had to rely more on party resources than their own. 
So, while party support gained significance in the electoral victory of candidates, the 
electoral power of parties became further entrenched. Existing parties limited the 
possible defection of politicians and similarly deterred new entrants (Lipset & Rokkan, 
1967, p. 34). Thus, only major parties of the working class were able to enter the party 
system, incorporating the Left into the party system. On the Right, old parties and the 
political divisions among them left from the previous two crucial junctures remained 
intact.  
Two implications can be drawn from the research of Lipset and Rokkan. First, the 
temporal logic that they analyzed is similar to the concept of “path dependence”.  A 
country’s party system develops in an evolutionary course. Outcomes of political 
interactions at each critical juncture are often rapidly locked in. What happen in the 
later critical juncture modify the path and the existing structure rather than reverse the 
path that has already taken shape. Early outcomes have lasting impacts. Moreover, 
inheritances of former junctures also shape the circumstances and set the norms for 
actors to behave, and thus inheritances of previous junctures may reproduce 
themselves in a new juncture  (Pierson, 2000, pp. 251-267; Thelen, 1999, pp. 392-395). 
As Lipset and Rokkan noted, “the decisive contrasts among the systems had emerged 
before the entry of the working-class parties into the political arena, and the character 
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of these mass parties was heavily influenced by the constellations of ideologies, 
movements, and organizations they had to confront in that arena” (p.151). 
Nevertheless, initial conditions are not determinative of the final outcome, and 
the path is not unchanged. Rather, the outcome observed at a critical juncture is only 
“related stochastically to initial conditions" (Goldstone, 1998, p. 834). How significant 
outcome of an earlier juncture is to a new critical juncture would depend on several 
factors. First, it is contingent on the type of events occurring at critical junctures. Some 
severe but unpredictable events may transform expectations of actors and alter long-
held norms. Here, the sequence of events and magnitude of a specific event in that 
sequence interact to decide the outcome. However, “because earlier parts of a 
sequence matter much more than later parts” (Pierson, 2000, p.263) early appearance 
in the sequence helps magnify the impacts of small events. Thus, later events that have 
path-breaking impact must have much larger magnitude to compensate for their late 
appearance in the sequence. Such kinds of events are often “exogenous shocks.” It 
should be noted that, some paths are open or vulnerable to exogenous shocks than 
others (Pierson, 2000, p.266). Political landscapes ushered in by the very first critical 
junctures would determine how vulnerable to shocks the path is. 
Second, actors also play a role in deciding outcomes at a critical juncture. While 
actors are constrained by rules predefined in the path, specific opportunities arising at a 
critical juncture can create room for manoeuvre. In the case of exogenous shocks, they 
can temporarily change the power structure or create incentives that favour change. 
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How outcomes unfold depends on how actors capture opportunities. Individual 
decisions may not always follow the rational choice model, and thus imply a lot of 
uncertainties.  
In all, critical junctures open opportunities, uncertainties and alternative paths. 
The outcome of a critical juncture is more than a repeat of an earlier juncture, but still 
not a complete change. “Change continues (in a path), but it is bounded change” 
(Pierson, 2000, p.265). 
 Another implication of Lipset and Rokkan’s analysis is the precedence of well 
organized parties before elections and mass enfranchise. This development and the 
subsequent nation-wide enfranchisement have mutual reinforcing effects; their relative 
temporal positions vis-à-vis each other have accounted for the consolidation of party 
systems in Western democracies. Lipset and Rokkan, however, took for granted the fact 
that parties precede elections and mass enfranchisement. As a consequence, most of 
their attention was directed to political factors that shaped or reshaped parties’ 
strategies for electoral survival at each of the following critical junctures. Accordingly, 
the main factor at the critical juncture was social cleavages, which were politically 
prominent in the population and thus could be used to attract votes. These cleavages 
included center–periphery and capitalist–working class axes (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967, pp. 
6-7). Lipset and Rookkan concluded that the appearance of these cleavages was a 
necessary condition for the solidification of a party system. Thus, the path that they 
identify becomes more or less deterministic. 
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Given the authors’ case selection, this problem is understandable. Cases in 
Western Europe are similar not only in their outcome – having stable party systems, but 
also in their initial conditions – adopting universal suffrage with available party 
organizations. A limitation becomes pronounced when this historical framework travels 
outside Western Europe. Studies have focused only on social cleavages to explain the 
instability of party systems in late democratizing countries, without sufficient awareness 
of Lipset and Rokkan’s assumption, let alone the temporal logic of their model. Too 
many cleavages or cleavages based on premodern identities, such as ethnicity, regions 
and religions, are argued to account for the instability of party systems (Randall, 2001). 
Mair points out the misinterpretation of Lipset-Rokkan model in the current literature. 
Studies have explained electoral and partisan stability by searching for evidence about 
the persistence of social cleavages, while the emphasis should be on the organizational 
longevity of parties and the persistence of party systems (Mair, 2001, p. 31). 
If one does not take the existence of a party as given, but as a variable, many 
puzzles emerge. What differences can the existence of party organization at the initial 
condition make to party system development? What if the party system does not 
develop in the three-step sequence as elaborated by Lipset and Rokkan?  What if these 
three steps occur in the matter of a few years, rather than over decades? These 
questions (and more) capture the reality of late democratizing countries (Randall, 2001, 
pp. 254-255). Unfortunately, few have answered these questions. In a preliminary 
attempt to do so, I propose an analytical framework based on the extension of Lipset 
and Rokkan’s temporal logic.  
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2.3 The paths of party system development 
To develop a framework that can incorporate the cases of developing 
democracies that Lipset and Rokkan did not consider, I elaborate the condition of 
parties when the first competitive elections with universal suffrage are held. In early 
democratizing countries, the first competitive elections may long precede the first 
competitive elections with universal suffrage, giving parties ample time to organize. In 
contrast, in most late democratizing countries, the first competitive elections often 
concur with universal suffrage. This poses more challenges for party organizers, as the 
time for parties to get ready is shorter, if not no time at all. Thus, the existence of 
effective party organizations prior to the first competitive elections with universal 
suffrage, regardless of whether they are formed before or during authoritarian regime, 
can make significant differences to party system development. My analysis here will 
demonstrate why it is so. 
2.3.1 Party formation  
Competitive elections motivate politicians to organize among themselves. The 
growing number of elected politicians enlarges the legislature’s size. It also brings more 
policy preferences into the legislative process, and thus increases the uncertainty of 
legislative voting. Politicians who can organize a stable coalition have better bargaining 
position vis-à-vis politicians who stand alone. Moreover, organized politicians can secure 
a share when their coalitions win. As such, they have vested interests in maintaining 
their coalitions. This eventually gives rise to parties within parliament. With universal 
suffrage and the expansion of elections nation-wide, the costs of electoral campaigns 
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increase, further incentivizing party organization. Culling human and capital resources to 
run for elections has advantages of the economies of scale. Politicians can also capitalize 
on common reputation from party labels to campaign in new constituencies (Aldrich, 
1995, pp. 29-45). 
Yet, the formation of parties does not simply result from interests that parties 
can bring to individual politicians. Party formation constitutes collective action. Building 
a party able to win legislative seats requires collective efforts to coordinate politicians, 
to attract donors and to mobilize voters. Politicians can get the returns of achieving 
policy preferences and sharing legislative spoils only after they have paid these set-up 
costs. This is the classic collective action dilemma in which everybody will benefit from 
parties in the long run but nobody wants to bear the immediate cost of organizing 
parties (Aldrich, 1995, p. 58). Successful party formation does not depend on collective 
interests parties can bring, but on the possibility of lessening the costs of establishing 
and maintaining parties. 
Given this logic of collective action, it is the issue of set-up costs that makes the 
preexistence of party organization at the eve of competitive elections with universal 
suffrage an advantage. This small advantage in the initial condition can have a large 
impact on the system’s later development. 
2.3.2 Preexisting party organization, positive feedback and the 
institutionalization of party system  
With the costs of establishing new parties, if some parties are available for 
elections at the start of universal suffrage, politicians are likely to align themselves with 
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existing parties rather than new ones. This advantage of preexisting parties produces 
“coordination effects” which further strengthen their positions in the party system. 
Coordination effects refer to the situation where “the benefits an individual receives 
from a particular activity increase as others adopt the same action” (Pierson, 2003, p. 
24). That many politicians prefer to join preexisting parties encourages others to join. 
The more candidates a party can recruit, the more appealing it becomes in the eyes of 
qualified candidates and wealthy donors.  
Internal strength of preexisting parties affects voters’ behavior. When parties are 
financially strong and have a sufficient number of qualified candidates, they can 
campaign in more constituencies. Voters are more likely to choose parties that they 
perceive as stronger and more popular among candidates and in the electorate. This is 
because rational voters often support parties with a higher chance to win (Cox, 1997). 
This type of strategic voting behavior is close to the concept of “adaptive expectation.” 
Expectations about the choices of other voters can lead individuals to “adapt their 
actions in ways that help to make those expectations come true” (Pierson, 2003, p. 24). 
Adaptive expectations of voters make viable parties even more viable in the party 
system. 
Coordination effects and adaptive expectations add up to increasing returns for 
preexisting parties. Once parties have gained significant reputation among politicians 
and voters, they are able to gain more. Increasing returns trigger positive feedback to 
the behavior of politicians and voters. In a situation of positive feedback, an early 
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adoption of an option generates a reinforcing process whereby actors benefit from this 
option, and thus are induced to adopt it further and improve it rather than consider 
other options. After each step, benefits accumulate; accordingly, the cost of switching 
rises. As a result, actors prefer to stay with the initial option rather than explore 
alternatives (Pierson, 2000, p.252). With regards to electoral politics, in the positive 
feedback process, politicians and voters see more benefits in staying with the same 
parties than switching to new ones. Moreover, as Pierson notes, it is not simply the 
existence of positive feedback but how quickly it can emerge that effectively eliminate 
other alternatives and initiate the freezing of a path. Thus, the readiness of preexisting 
parties gives those parties a crucial advantage. The rapid consolidation and expansion of 
preexisting parties limits the entry of new parties. The strength of existing parties vis-à-
vis potential challengers helps to stabilize party system.  
2.3.3 The absence of party organization and the struggle to institutionalize  
party systems 
Where there is no party organization preceding the first competitive elections 
with universal suffrage, a party system faces tremendous uncertainty in the direction it 
will head. The path to institutionalization depends on the chance of successful collective 
action to form parties at the critical juncture.  
As was mentioned above, the benefits that parties can bring do not 
automatically result in party formation. A crucial task of forming the very first party 
organizations in the initial condition is overcoming the collective action dilemma. Its 
solution requires political entrepreneurs with skillful leadership and commitment from 
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members. Value-oriented interests are more sustainable than purely material interests 
(Weber, 1968, p. 25). Where interests are purely materialistic, parties are typically 
short-lived. Desires to share the legislative spoils often result in “minimal parties.” 
Politicians would prefer to form the smallest groups large enough to win elections. 
Parties are kept as small as possible to increase the size of each member’s share 
(Aldrich, 1995, Chapter 2). The small size of parties, coupled with their unfledged 
organization, renders parties vulnerable to member defections. As parties are small, 
their coordination effects are also limited. Moreover, in the early stage of party 
formation, parties are still new in the eyes of the voters. Young parties have yet built up 
distinct identities and reputation. In other words, the younger parties are, the lower 
costs of defection for politicians, the lower the incentives for politicians to stick to 
parties, and the higher the possibility of new groups to emerge and outcompete these 
weak parties. In each election, politicians can simply switch to new groups that promise 
the highest shares. Continual party switching prevents consolidation. Over time, these 
parties are not sufficiently attractive to recruit and retain members.   
Not less challenging than the task of coordinating politicians is the task of 
competing for votes. Universal suffrage creates an influx of new voters, many of whom 
reside far away from the capital. Party candidates have to campaign in unfamiliar 
constituencies. Parties that emerge from organized opposition movements prior to 
democratization may have available grassroot networks.10 For parties that form just in 
                                                          
10
 They are the cases of leftist parties in Spain and Portugal, which emerged as major parties after 
authoritarian regime(Diamandouros & Gunther, 2001). 
39 
 
time for registering in the first national election, the lack of ready local offices as well as 
“brand name” restrict their capacity to communicate with local voters. Accordingly, 
there may be few choices other than recruiting local elites to help tap into local 
networks. 
From the experience of developed democracies, Caramani (2004) postulates that 
competitive national elections induce local elites to join parties. The more valuable 
national seats are, the more electoral competition in local constituencies becomes. As a 
result, local candidates need to rely on parties for financial support and reputation. This 
argument, however, assumes that parties have reliable financial capacity and national 
reputation, something that is not self-evident in late democratizing countries. The 
relationship between national parties and local elites is contingent on the success of 
party consolidation at the center. If parties fail to consolidate at the center, they have 
few members and few financial resources to support and thus attract local elites. In this 
situation, competitive national elections place fledging parties more in need of local 
elites than local elites need the parties. Since electoral campaigns depend more on 
candidates’ personal reputation than parties’ identities, according to adaptive effects, 
constituents can become more affiliated with individual candidates than with parties. 
Over time, local elites accumulate power at the expense of parties. 
The above scenarios relate to my argument that unsuccessful collective action in 
party organization at the critical juncture can produce negative feedback. Negative 
feedback refers to a situation in which a change in an initial factor A leads to a change in 
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factor B. A change in factor B, however, produces value that attenuates the value of a 
change in A, making the overall value of changes zero or negative. As changes bring no 
value, there is no incentive for changes, and the system cannot move forward; it is fixed 
in its initial condition (Jervis, 1997, chapter 4). This concept fits in large part the scenario 
of emerging parties depicted above. To recapitulate, when elections are introduced or 
reintroduced, politicians must form or join parties to participate. However, since parties 
do not possess organizational platforms or reputations,11 and party membership brings 
little if no benefits to politicians, politicians have few interests in committing themselves 
to the same parties. Parties often evanesce after a few elections because of a loss of 
membership. The party system experiences high startup and mortality rates; therefore, 
it can hardly develop beyond the initial stage that is disorganized and atomized. 
2.3.4 Summing up the framework 
The above analysis demonstrates that party systems can follow different paths, 
depending on initial conditions under which parties emerge. The trajectory described by 
Lipset and Rokkan is only one among many; it just happens to be characterized by 
effective party organization before the country is fully democratized. As such, it is the 
most favorable path to institutionalization. In contrast, in most late democratizing 
                                                          
11
 Reputation of surviving parties in the pre-authoritarian period has proven to affect party politics in the 
post-authoritarian era. Surviving parties may rely on their historical reputation for particular policies, 
struggles or political leadership to enhance their legitimacy in the post-authoritarian elections. While 
actual policy positions may evolve to meet varied socio-economic demands over time, reputation, at least 
in term of legitimacy or association with certain traditions, do constrain party leaders’ competitive 
strategies. Some well-known examples include: in Spain, Socialist Party was founded in the early years of 
the twentieth century and reentered elections in 1977 (Gunther, 1986); in Greece, the identity of 
Panhellenic Socialist Movement was not destroyed by the military dictatorship from 1967 to 1974 
(Diamandouros & Gunther, 2001, chapter 3); In Argentina, Justicialist Party remained famous for its 
“Peronist” political identity that was associated with its founder Juan Domingo Peron and the working 
class movement Peron had led, when it returned to politics in the 1980s (Levitsky, 1998). 
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countries, parties lack ready organizations for the first competitive elections. Such 
systems can be either highly or poor institutionalize contingently on the outcomes of 
collective action to establish parties during the first few, post-authoritarian elections. 
Under severe time, finance and reputation constraints, the prospect of party formation 
is dimmer and the chance of party system institutionalization is more uncertain than the 
cases with preexisting party organization.  
2.4 A new trend in the literature 
In the literature on Thailand’s party politics, historical factors have started to 
play important roles in analyses of the poor institutionalization of the country's party 
system. Comparing Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia, Ufen (2008) pointed out 
that both Thailand and the Philippines have similarly fragmented party systems, which 
are more unstable than that of Indonesia's, although Thailand followed parliamentarism 
and the Philippines presidentialism. While he could hardly go into details of how history 
could make differences in three cases within the length of a journal article, he put 
forward an eclectic framework examining multiple historical and structural factors, and 
noted the importance of contexts and preconditions of a party system’s reemergence.  
Following his comparative work on formal institutions in Thailand and the 
Philippines, Hicken has acknowledged the significance of historical factors on party 
system development. With a greater data pool from a number of Asian developing 
democracies, Hicken and Kuhonta (2011) found that legacies of an authoritarian regime 
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affected current levels of party system institutionalization. Their work was the first to 
systematically demonstrate the role of historical legacies. 
These aforementioned studies, although still few in number, have started a new 
trend in the literature on Asian developing democracies, as well as on Thai party politics. 
With the initial attention to the role of history as a critical explanatory variable, further 
studies are needed to elaborate why and how historical contexts can play this role. My 
thesis will attempt this task in the following chapters. 
This chapter has developed a framework for identifying important historical 
legacies and examining their impact on the current disarray of the Thai party system. A 
review of the literature has shown that applying a theoretical framework constructed 
from experiences of Western developed democracies to the Thai case has yet to prove 
convincing in explaining the party system’s lack of institutionalization. While my analysis 
demonstrates that one still can usefully borrow from the broader literature, its lessons 
should be applied with caution. One should take greater heed of such issues as the 
relative temporal positions between the first competitive elections, universal suffrage 
and party formation, rather than generally accepting the assumptions of current 
theories. These critical factors differentiate early from late democratizing countries. 
More importantly, I have described the causal mechanisms that sustain different paths 
party systems can follow. 
These mechanisms primarily account for the impact of historical legacies on 
subsequent development of a party system. To trace the roots of historical legacies in 
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the Thai case, I delve into the pre-1973 period. I explore its parties, why they failed, and 
how their failure placed a burden on subsequent parties. I focus two periods of the pre-
1973 era: one is from the 1932 coup that brought down the absolute monarchy until the 
outbreak of World War II, and the other is the first party system that existed between 
1945 and 1948. Chapter three analyzes the post-1932 coup period not merely to provide 
background information on the parties of the first party system. My principal argument 
is that without historical contingencies after the war, a party system could have 
emerged, evolved and become institutionalized. Conducting a thought experiment in 
chapter four, I highlight how a coincidental convergence of several events and how 
political choices produced unintentional outcomes, preventing the continuity of party 
formation in the 1945-1948 period. The last empirical chapter examines the legacies of 
the first party system by analyzing the politics of party reemergence since the military 
government reintroduced election in 1969. This part verifies the causal mechanism I 
construct above. That is, how the absence of party organization at the first competitive 
elections with universal suffrage increased uncertainties, triggered negative feedback 
and obstructed the consolidation of parties and the party system.  
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Chapter Three: Sowing the Party Seeds (1932 – 1944) 
In 1932, the absolute rule of the Thai monarchy was terminated by a coup of 
Western-educated elites who called themselves the Promoters. Ranging from young 
military men, bureaucrats and students, the Promoters and their supporters shared the 
common frustration at the slow reforms the Chakri Dynasty had promised. To advance 
their ideals for sociopolitical modernization of Thailand and to prepare for the coup, 
they organized the People’s Party. The Promoters thought the party would represent 
the Thai masses, teaching it democratic values (Pridi Phanomyong in Thak, 1978, pp. 51-
70). After the Promoters had successfully seized power from the monarchy, they sought 
to turn their party into a mass-based one.12 Their plan never materialized, however. To 
protect themselves against the royalists, the Promoters bargained with King Prajadhipok 
for a deal, which put the first party system on hold. They dissolved their own party and 
disallowed the registration of other political parties in the first election, in exchange for 
the dissolution of the royalist Nationalist Party (Murashima, 1991, pp. 11, 16 and 29). 
Moreover, after the royalist rebellion against the new government in November 1933, 
the Promoters’ government decided to extend the interim period, originally conceived 
as three years, for twelve years.13 The Promoters proclaimed to be the ruling group 
before the country would be fully democratized. 
                                                          
12
 Their activities were reported in a series of articles titled “the People’s Association” printed on several 
pages of the Bangkok Times Weekly Mail published on 30 August, 26, 28, 30 September and 15 October 
1932. 
13
 For the organization and dissolution of the People’s Party, see “The People’s Association” in the 
Bangkok Times Weekly Mail (9 January and 22 April 1933). 
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Nevertheless, however limited the actual political reforms the Promoters 
implemented, the 1932 Coup-plotters did initiate a new political phase. They sowed the 
seeds of an embryonic parliament and a semi-accountable government. While the 
Promoters ruled, their government was responsible to the parliament. Elections took 
place in 1933, 1937 and 1938 to choose half of parliament from outside the coup group. 
These early parties gradually took shape through parliamentary activities in which 
members of parliament (MPs) organized among themselves to push for motions, to 
support or to oppose the government’s actions. 
The previous chapter argued that initial conditions, such as the institutions left 
by the first party system, laid the foundation for the development of the succeeding 
party system, even when the system was disrupted by a period of authoritarian rule. 
This chapter explores the sociopolitical conditions out of which the first Thai party 
system emerged. I postulate that the early organization of Thai political parties resulted 
from the outgrowth of political groupings in an embryonic parliament and the splits 
among the Promoters. The existence of elections and the outbreak of World War II in 
Thailand were main factors in accelerating the organization of political parties. 
3.1 Responsible government and opportunities for collective actions  
While the Promoters’ government controlled elections, the existence of 
elections without doubt pushed politicians to organize. Because of elections, the 
parliament gained relative independence from the ruling group, thereby creating space 
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for collective action. Furthermore, elections politicized the Bangkok-provinces divide 
that would decisively shape the future party system.  
Although the first batch of elected MPs in the 1933 Parliament comprised only 
half of the parliament, they were keen on exercising their political mandate and making 
the parliament more than a rubber stamp of the Promoters.  As outsiders to the coup 
group, the elected MPs had vested interests in expanding political channels for 
competition and participation. Accordingly, they tried to initiate several motions to 
legislate for political parties (Murashima, 1991, pp. 35-39). 
Such demands put the Promoters in a bind. On the one hand, they hesitated 
opening opportunities for political forces to threaten their young government. On the 
other hand, the prohibition against organizing parties seemed increasingly incompatible 
with the democratic rationale that the Promoters advocated in their 1932 Coup. Thus, 
although the government did not immediately legalize the registration of political 
parties in elections, neither did it explicitly oppose the organization of MPs within 
parliament.14 
The indeterminate signals from the Promoters’ government raised the hopes of 
elected MPs. Expecting that parties would eventually be recognized to compete in free 
elections, many of them enthusiastically formed groups in preparation of D-day. They 
                                                          
16 
The Promoters, especially the civilians led by Pridi Phanomyong, ideologically supported popular 
participation and democracy, which was a part of their original plan for the 1932 coup (Pridi Banomyong 
in Thak, 1978, pp. 55, 61). After the Borowadet rebellion by royalist forces, the Promoters wanted to slow 
the political reforms down in order to consolidate their power first, but they still sought to build up their 
legitimacy through constitutional means and democratic principles – at least at the face values. Thus, 
although the Promoters disallowed the organization of political parties, they still held elections 
(Murashima, 1991, pp. 28-29, 36). 
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planned, conducted fundraising activities and devised policy platforms. In the 1937 and 
1938 elections, the government increased the number of non-coup group members to 
the parliament,15 further encouraging politician organization. In a larger parliament, the 
benefits of collective action in large numbers became more apparent. In the run-up to 
the 1937 election, about forty candidates informally organized to support each other in 
their political campaigns.  
Elections also created another factor that pulled MPs together. Elections 
introduced societal cleavages into parliament, especially that of center-periphery. The 
cultural, ethnic and economic gaps between the capital and the provinces had been 
salient since the modernization of the Thai state since the era of King Chulalongkorn 
onward. The regional divide was especially profound between the northeast provinces 
and Bangkok. Bordering Indochina, the northeast was relatively isolated from other 
regions of Thailand.  The area was also home to illegal immigrants--poor peasants or 
revolutionary elements hiding from their home governments.16 This made the northeast 
a trouble area in the eyes of the central government. The northeasterners themselves 
resented their economic backwardness. An emerging regional identity was a centripetal 
force binding northeastern MPs. They were among the earliest to register their party for 
the 1938 election, although the government rejected their application (Keyes, 1967, pp. 
14-21). 
                                                          
15
 See footnote 15 
16
 By WWII, there were approximately 20,000 to 30,000 Vietnamese migrants in the northeastern 
Thailand. British and French secret polices reported broad underground networks of arm traffic by the 
Vietnamese in northeastern Thailand (Goscha, 1999, chapter 2). 
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Self-organization within the parliament grew so viable that elected MPs could 
maintain a coalition within the parliament to counter the Promoters.  However, elected-
MP activism was insufficient to drive democratization, for the fact that this block did not 
comprise the majority of the parliament to transform its demands into actual policies. 
Only when internal rivalry amongst the Promoters weakened their government, as well 
as the arrival of war, was collective action able to turn parliament and foster political 
mobilization.  
3.2 Political organization 
After the Promoters had gained control of the political process, marked by the 
abdication of King Prajadhipok in 1935, an internal rift grew between military and 
civilian members.17 Although the latter, led by Pridi Phanomyong, played a main role in 
organizing the People’s Party at the outset and in drafting government policies, military 
members gradually gained a dominant position (Baker & Phasuk, 2005, p. 121). Young 
military men under the leadership of Phibun Songkhram were lauded as national 
heroes, when they suppressed several royalist rebellions and helped protect the young 
government of the Promoters against the old elites. With their achievements, Phibun 
and his military comrades easily seized government, when Phraya Phahon, the senior 
leader of the Promoters and the prime minister, retired in 1938 (Suwannathat-Pian, 
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 After the 1932 Coup, the then King Prajadhipok capitulated to turn his rule into a constitutional 
monarch, but he still tried to reassert his political influences. After successfully suppressing the royalist 
Bowaradet, the Promoters took an uncompromising stand against him. By the late 1934, the King 
requested to negotiate with the Promoters where he would have reconciled with them if they had 
satisfied his demands. Otherwise, he would have abdicated. The Promoters officially refused in January 
1935, and the King kept his words (Batson, 1974, chapter 9). 
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1995, pp. 168-181). Phibun's ascendency marked a turning point in the country's post-
1932 politics. 
Phibun believed that only a strong military leadership could help Thailand quickly 
modernize and develop (Thamsook, 1978). As Phibun provocatively claimed, the 
monarchy could die, the government could be reshuffled, and only the military could 
stand permanently to protect the country (Stowe, 1991). Together with his policies to 
promote modern culture, nationalism and loyalty towards the modern Thai state, 
Phibun strengthened military power at the expense of civilians in the policy-making 
process. He rejected enacting a political party law and prolonged the aforementioned 
interim period indefinitely. Given his militarist tendencies, Phibun sided with the 
Japanese during WWII. He allowed their troops to use Thailand as a military base, and 
subsequently declared war against the Allies in 1942 (Reynolds, 2004). 
While the rise of militarism seemed to obstruct the emergence of a party 
system, it also brought civilian Promoters, who opposed Phibun, and elected MPs 
together. Moreover, many saw the stationing of Japanese troops as a violation of Thai 
sovereignty. These anti-Phibun elements formed an underground movement, calling 
itself Free Thai, which sought cooperation with the Allies in order to fight the Japanese, 
while also hoping to topple Phibun's military government. As a founder of the People’s 
Party and a prominent civilian leader of Phibun’s generation, Pridi again played a leading 
role in the organization and the final success of the Free Thai movement. He brought 
independent MPs, overseas Thais in the US and UK and the navy into a common anti-
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Japanese front. With his connections with foreign leaders in the Allies, Pridi helped the 
Free Thais gain recognition and support from the Allies (Reynolds, 2005, chapters 7 and 
8). 
It should be noted that the Free Thai movement never reached the scale of 
violence or the scope of political involvement of mass mobilization in other Southeast 
Asian countries. Its activities were concentrated in the north, especially in the frontier 
provinces, since the Japanese were stationed in the south and were supported by the 
Thai military (Pridi Banamyong in Thak, 1978, p. 377). This is one reason why the 
majority of local people in the movement were northerners and northeasterners. 
Moreover, as Thailand had never been fully occupied by the Japanese or Allied powers, 
the movement's existence was too brief to take root deeply in society and to mobilize a 
large following.  That said, the Free Thai movement provided a viable vehicle for political 
organization. 
One group comprising the Free Thai was the radical civilians and MPs of the 
defunct People’s Party. Having neither a political constituency of their own nor coercive 
power, these civilians had lost out to Phibun's military wing.  Through activities in the 
movement, they expanded their political bases. They also obtained cooperation from 
the Navy, whose leaders had embraced liberal ideas of the radical Promoters since the 
wake of the People’s Party (Sorasak, 1991, p. 15). More significantly, for the first time 
after the People’s Party ceased to function, its members reached out to the rural 
grassroots. The Free Thai movement distributed weapons to local people, developed 
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communication points with the anti-Japanese forces from China and Indochina and 
trained Thai volunteers for an uprising in collaboration with the Allies (Reynolds, 2005, 
chapter 7 and 8). These activities helped future party leaders forge ties with the rural 
electorate. Because of his leadership of the Free Thai movement, Pridi became one of 
the most popular post-war, public figures. 
A second group of active participants were politicians from the northeast. As was 
mentioned above, because of their vested interests in the democratization process, 
these MPs opposed Phibun. His brand of Thai nationalism also further alienated regional 
leaders of the northeast (Keyes, 1967, p. 28). Furthermore, histories of contact with 
Indochinese revolutionaries exposed them to leftist ideals (Goscha, 1999, pp. 90-94), 
and thus they found commonalities with Pridi’s liberal-democratic values. Collaboration 
between Pridi’s group and the northeastern camp engendered mutual benefits. While 
the former gained access to the northeast to set up a strategic base for their movement, 
the latter took advantage of the political space created by the split within the coup 
group to organize and advance regional interests.18  
Unaware of the domestic Free Thais, some Thais overseas gathered under the 
leadership of Seni Pramot, the then ambassador to the United States, to launch an 
independent diplomatic campaign against the Japanese occupation. This group was 
largely a spontaneous response of foreign-educated Thai to the loss of Thailand’s 
sovereignty, and initially did not represent any domestic political group (Reynolds, 2005, 
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 The Free Thai needed this base to contact and collaborate with anti-Japanese forces in Indochina, 
although at the end no real fights with the Japanese took place in Thailand (Goscha, 1999, pp. 128-129). 
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pp. 21-29). Nevertheless, after they joined forces with domestic counterparts in 1943, 
the group quickly was reshaped by the dynamics of Thai politics. 
Before the close of WWII, the Free Thai movement helped to engineer Phibun's 
downfall. A group of about twenty northeastern MPs opposed two proposals of 
Phibun’s government – one to relocate the capital and the other to build a Buddhist city. 
With coordination behind the scenes led by Pridi, the northeastern group obtained 
majority support from the parliament (“Bill Recalls History of Partisan Politics,” BKP, 23 
September 1946, p.1). This parliamentary opposition escalated into a motion 
demanding Phibun's resignation (Pridi Banamyong in Thak, 1978, pp. 383-384), which 
resulted in the toppling of Phibun in July 1944. The Free Thai movement had achieved a 
historic victory, and now Thai politics was at a crossroads.  
After Phibun's government fell, political parties arose, despite being unable to be 
formally registered. Northeastern politicians were the first to announce theirs--the 
Cooperative Party (Sahacheep) (“Bill Recalls History of Partisan Politics,” BKP, 23 
September 1946, p.1). As its name reveals, the party espoused Socialist ideals; peasant 
issues stood at the core of its platform (Wilson, 1967, p. 236). The remaining members 
of the Free Thai movement formed the Constitutional Front Party under the leadership 
of Pridi and Thamrong Nawasawat.19 The latter had more members than the 
Cooperative Party, although it seemed less organized. Pridi's party was modeled after 
the anti-militarism liberal front of the Allies, and drew members from various sources: 
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 Thamrong was the speaker of the parliament at that time, and he kept the official leadership of the 
Constitutional Front, while Pridi was the actual leader behind. 
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bureaucrats, incumbent MPs, radical intelligentsia, bureaucratic capitalists and Pridi’s 
supporters in the Navy (Sorasak, 1991, p. 29). 
The emergence of left and left-of-center parties presented a challenge to the 
rightists in the Free Thai movement, most of who were from Seni's overseas group; 
others were state officials or MPs of noble origins. Cooperation between the overseas 
Free Thais and the domestic Free Thais was never easy. In the eyes of the former, the 
latter were rude, gangster-like and alien to the Bangkokian educated Thais (Van Praagh, 
1989, pp. 40-50). Neither was the situation more comfortable for some upper class 
elements in the domestic Free Thais. They were not sold on radical ideas, and as such, 
felt increasingly insecure to see the organization of leftist forces and the consolidation 
of Pridi’s leadership on account of the support of other domestic Free Thais. The most 
notable split within the domestic Free Thai movement occurred between Pridi and 
Khuang Aphaiwong. A junior member of the 1932 coup group’s civilian wing, Khuang 
joined the Free Thai in the later months as a secret collaborator who publicly continued 
to work for Phibun’s government. He did not have close contact with the movement on 
the ground. Neither did he wholeheartedly support Pridi’s ideals since the early days of 
the Promoters. By the end of the war, Khuang was leaning towards the overseas Free 
Thai group. Reacting to the organization of the domestic Free Thais, Khuang and Seni led 
remaining Free Thai members to establish the Democrat Party. Their party proclaimed 
itself loyal to the King, to protect social order, and to favor liberal economic policies 
(Sorasak, 1991, p. 30). 
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3.3 The road ahead  
In all, elections, the politicization of capital-periphery cleavages, and a short 
burst of political mobilization worked together to bring about Thailand's first party 
system. In 1945, when WWII was drawing to an end, the Free Thais took the opportunity 
to establish a genuine parliament. They promulgated a new Constitution that prohibited 
military officers and bureaucrats from holding parliamentary positions, required direct 
elections of all MPs, and removed the system of appointed MPs. The prospect that 
Phibun and the military would return to power appeared dim, as the Allies were 
requesting Japan’s collaborators to stand trial for war crimes (Darling, 1963, p. 130). 
Finally, political parties were allowed to exist officially and readied themselves for the 




Chapter Four: The First Party System 1945-1948 
I define the initial development of the Thai party system as the period when a 
party system first emerges. This period appeared shortly in Thai politics when parties 
grew out of the Free Thai movement in 1945, but were closed by Phibun's return in 
1948.  This thesis has argued that the nature and structure of political parties in the first 
period shaped future party systems when democratization resurrected political parties 
after many years of authoritarian rule. This chapter analyzes the structure of the first 
party system of Thailand, why its parties failed and their subsequent fate following the 
installation of Phibun's second government.  
Examining the historical accounts of the late 1940s, I contend that the 
Democrat's campaigns against the first elected government and its efforts to undermine 
the Constitutional Front and the Cooperative parties, be it for reasons good or bad, 
arguably paved the way for Phibun's return. In the short-term, without the Democrat 
Party’s tacit support and the opportunities that the Democrats helped open, Phibun and 
his military supporters could not have returned to the political scene so quickly. The 
longer the military had to postpone its plans for a coup, the less likely it was that a coup 
would have been successful. Also, the civilian government would have had more time to 
consolidate its power. The Democrat’s actions thus disrupted a political process that 
would have favored the development of political parties. From a long-term perspective, 
these actions prevented an emerging party system from consolidating itself.  
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Since this first multiparty parliament period was so brief, it tends to be 
overlooked.20  However, these emerging parties should not be dismissed out of hand 
because of the social backwardness of the masses in the 1940s. Mass participation is not 
a necessary condition for the development of political parties. As Sartori once concluded 
from his historical analysis of political parties in developed countries, “it is not the 
'objective' class that creates the party, but the party that creates the 'subjective' class 
…The party is not a 'consequence' of the class…[but] it is the class that receives its 
identity from the party” (Sartori, 1969, p. 84). Indeed, at the initial stage, membership in 
political parties was often confined only to the elites interconnected by personal 
relations, and these elites composed of both the state and civil society (Katz & Mair, 
1995, pp. 5, 28-29). In many European examples, early political parties emerged from 
the intra-group conflicts of the political elites and were reflective of their political 
attitudes in response to historical events, rather than being a reflection of mass 
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 In one of the earliest detailed analyses into this period, David Wilson refused to describe these groups 
as “political parties”, because, according to Wilson, their “representative function at its broadest does not 
extend beyond a clique or group of cliques” (Wilson, 1967, p. 233).  Riggs added that such political groups 
could not have created a “party” system, for they lacked the popular participation to be considered 
parties. Riggs described their membership as limited to political elites who were bound together by 
personal relationship and by their links to the state. Furthermore, political competition was motivated 
largely by personal values and elite interests, rather than by macro-social conflicts (Riggs, 1966, pp. 182, 
213-215). In the meantime, these pioneering studies significantly framed the view of latter research on 
Thai party politics--in a bureaucratic polity that lasted at least until the late 1960s, there were no true 
political parties in Thailand.  
As Michael Connors has commented, guided by modernization theory, Riggs and Wilson assumed that the 
stages of social development defined political institutions and explained the nature of political conflicts 
(Connors, 2007, pp. 10-12). Their conception of political parties was also framed by the mass party model. 
Riggs succinctly wrapped up his ideas by putting forward the question of “functionalism for whom” (Riggs, 
1966, p. 346). In his view, the Thai public in the 1940s was not sufficiently modernized to organize 
themselves for political causes--for one, an adequate division between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie 
had yet to develop. In this pre-modernized society, according to Wilson, there were no demands for 
extra-bureaucratic organizations, which carried the functions of interest articulation, political socialization 





organization from below. In Europe, it took decades for these political parties to engage 
the masses (Dogan, 1967). 
Given that mass membership is not the criterion to define political parties, these 
young groups of the 1940s, including the Constitutional Front, the Cooperative Party 
and the Democrat Party, could legitimately be characterized as political parties. From 
this point of view, I also do not assess their performance based on the mass party 
model. Instead, this chapter emphasizes the decisions and choices of party leaders in 
creating and defending their parties. In the period of party creation, where organization 
is rudimentary and rules are malleable, elites play a decisive role in shaping parties and 
the competition between them. 
4.1 The Beginnings of a Party System 
By late 1945, the political parties that had emerged from the Free Thai 
movement finally gave rise to a party system. The latter was structured along the lines 
of political orientation and geography. The left-leaning Cooperative Party was also the 
party of the northeast. The conservative, royalist Democrat Party was led by the urban, 
upper class, and also incorporated several prominent politicians from southern 
provinces.21 The then largest party, the Constitutional Front, stood at the center of the 
political spectrum. These political patterns were similar to other party systems 
elsewhere that possessed central-peripheral and left-right cleavages (Lipset & Rokkan, 
1967, pp. 158-168). Such political patterns might provide a stable base for parties to 
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 It was so, because one of its founders, Khlai La-ongmani, was a renowned leader from Songkhla – a 
southern province (Wilson, 1967, pp. 226-228). Khlai helped the Democrat Party recruit and groom many 
leaders from the South  (Askew, 2008, pp. 314-315; Nishizaki, 2009). 
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develop, regulate electoral competition and eventually facilitate an institutionalized 
party system. 
Indeed, no sooner were these parties established than their leaders aimed to 
instill party discipline and expand their organizations. They held regular meetings, for 
example, before each parliamentary session to discuss and to work toward common 
positions of their parties.22 Standing as smaller parties, members of the Cooperative and 
the Democrat parties especially understood the importance of collective action. They 
collaborated with their party fellows in different constituencies, including the pooling of 
funds, standardizing their speeches and supporting campaigns of each other, in order to 
maximize their collective strength (“On the Political Front,” BKP, 17 April 1947, p.8). 
Furthermore, all parties put effort into reaching out to new constituencies. While the 
Democrats sent their representatives to the northeastern provinces (“Democrats 
wooing nation at large,” BKP, 16 January, 22 March and 7 May 1947, p.8), the 
Cooperative Party and the Constitutional Front met with urban workers, organized a 
Labor Committee in the Parliament, and supported the establishment of labor unions on 
the shop floor.23 These nascent efforts, if sustained, might have fostered a stable party 
system over time.  In other words, time appeared to be a main factor for a multiparty 
system to mature. 
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 The BKP had regular reports about internal meetings of each party on its front pages during 1946 and 
1947. 
23
 The BKP had several articles reporting labor problems in its August issues. For a report about the 
activities of PMs and the government in organizing labor, see “Ministries discussed problems of labor” 
(BKP, 8 August 1946, p.1) 
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4.2 Political sins 
This said, “structurally improbable factors” were not necessarily “politically 
impossible.” Opportunities were seen through the eyes of political actors and realized 
through their actions. Outcomes depended on how actors chose to act and their skills to 
achieve their goals. As Di Palma (1990, chapter 1) has found, many democratic 
movements succeeded in countries that were thought to be unsuitable for democracy.  
Similarly, one could argue that political actors might not always consider factors 
structurally probable to the development of political parties as politically favorable.  
In Thailand, the Democrats were increasingly intimidated by the fact that 
regional politicians, leftists and anti-royal politicians were gaining power through the 
electoral victories of the Cooperative and the Constitutional Front parties. These 
political divides, motivating factors for political organization, in the end destroyed the 
party system. While the three main parties initially agreed on the values of democracy 
in theory and consented to develop a party system, the Democrats, on one side, and the 
Cooperative and the Constitutional Front parties, on the other, had different 
expectations about democracy in practice. This largely revolved around the function of 
elections. These differences created a rift between the parties and prevented them from 
working together to maintain a system they had worked hard to establish.  Predictably, 
conservative forces sought to take advantage of or exploit this opportunity.  
The August 1946 election results reflected strengths and weaknesses of each 
party. The Democrats won the smallest number of seats; the majority of its votes were 
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limited to Bangkok and Chonburi, the country's two largest economic centers. The 
Constitutional Front and the Cooperative parties shared the largest number of votes, 
and dominated the rural constituencies (“Sahacheep gets twenty eight and Constitution 
twenty-nine of seventy-five seats,” BKP, 9 August 1946, p.1). This electoral outcome was 
not a surprise, since the Democrats had not featured significantly in the domestic 
political scene beforehand. In contrast, the other two parties had many candidates from 
the provinces, and their organizational precursors during the Free Thai movement 
remained active in the countryside.  
Disillusioned with  the loss, Democrat leaders attempted to rationalize their 
failure by shifting the blame to other factors--for example, rural voters, so the 
rationalization went, lacked sufficient knowledge to choose "the right" political leaders. 
Seni lamented that the decreased quality of elected politicians compared to those under 
Phibun’s government. In all, in the view of Democrat leaders, the Thai voters, not 
acquainted with democratic practice and principles, made ill-informed choices, which in 
turn resulted in an undemocratic election (Interview with Seni by BKP, 29 January 1947, 
p.1). 
One consequence of this deprecating attitude among Democrat leaders was that 
they looked down on the other parties. They proclaimed that the Constitutional Front 
and the Cooperative Party, for instance, promoted partisan and parochial interests, 
which ultimately were detrimental to Thailand.  Moreover, the political ideals these 
parties embraced were alien to Thai culture, and might incite disloyalty to the state (“On 
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the Political Front,” BKP, 22 March 1947, p.8). This perception was reinforced by their 
personal suspicion of Pridi and his men. The conservatives were alarmed at the 
friendship among Pridi, the Cooperative party and the leftist radicals from elsewhere in 
Southeast Asia.  Illustratively, he allowed the Indochinese Communists to use Bangkok 
as a station to contact the outside world, and the northeastern politicians gave weapons 
left behind from WWII to Vietnamese Communists stationed in Thailand (Goscha, 1999, 
pp. 184-188). Pridi also initiated a plan to establish the Southeast Asia League in which 
its members would support each other in their respective independence movements 
(Keyes, 1967, p. 31). Regardless of whether Pridi was leaning toward Communist ideals, 
his actions and those of his supporters fueled the ire of the conservatives. 
Their limited influence on the organization and values of the party system was a 
tough pill to swallow for the Democrat leaders. They had supported the establishment 
of the first party system and competitive elections with a vision that parties and 
elections would function like those in developed Western countries.24 Reality, however, 
diverged from their expectations, and more importantly, the electoral process appeared 
to diminish their role in society. In response, its leaders tried to bring down a 
government that it blamed as corrupt.  
For three months since the Constitutional Front and Cooperative coalition 
elected Thamrong as the Prime Minister, Democrats bombarded his government with 
accusations against every policy and practice it made. The first series of attacks 
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 Seni once revealed his expectation that elections and parties in Thailand would progress like those of 
Western countries in an interview with the BKP (Interview with Seni by BKP, 29 January 1947, p.1). 
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concerned the difficult post-war economic conditions. During the parliamentary session 
of December 1946, Democrats initiated debates on the government’s ability to curb 
inflation and control price hikes (“MPs Rally to Assist Nai Khuang,” BKP, 21 December 
1946, p.1). The attacks continued into 1947 with stronger criticisms against the 
government’s rice export policy. When Thamrong decided to sell Thailand’s gold 
reserves in the United States and proposed the Revenue Code Amendment Act, 
Democrats pounced.25  Throughout 1947, parliamentary sessions featured protests 
against the government’s agricultural funding bills and fierce criticism against 
corruption. 
While the mistakes of Thamrong’s government were undeniable, the Democrat 
Party made the matter worse. In public, they waged public campaigns to savage 
Thamrong’s government by holding talks and giving speeches condemning corruption in 
the government in attempt to woo voters (“Democrats wooing nation at large,” BKP, 16 
January 1947, p.8). In Parliament, they continually raised motions in every session to call 
for the resignation of the cabinet and Thamrong.26 Although his government survived 
several impeachment attempts, this perpetual hostility from the opposition destabilized 
his government. Parliament debates often became endless fights among the 
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 Details of the Democrats’ campaigns against the then government was reviewed in Praphon 
Angsukasikorn’s article about political incidents leading up to the November Coup in 1947 (“Dramatic 
Political Story behind November Coup,” BKP, 31 December 1947, pp.5-8). 
26
 In December 1946, Khuang demanded that Thamrong removed one of his cabinet members serving as 
Minister of Commerce. In February and March 1947, Democrats rallied several calls for reshuffling the 
government. In May 1947, another motion against the government emerged (“16 Supporters for Motion,” 
23 December 1946, p.1; “Sahacheep for Thavi as Premier, Constitutional Front still Favors Thamrong,” 21 
February 1947, p.1; “On the Political Front,” BKP, 22 March 1947, p.8). 
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government, its allies and the opposition. Instead of working toward a solution to the 
country's socio-economic problems, MPs bickered amongst themselves.  
Worse, rumors hounded the government. Witnessing the tension in parliament, 
the public could not help but predict the downfall of Thamrong’s government 
(“Government May Be Picked on Sunday,” BKP, 19 February 1947, p.1). Mention of a 
new cabinet appeared in Thai-language newspapers so often that Thamrong complained 
to be annoyed by “governments formed by the press” (“On the Political Front,” BKP, 17 
April 1947, p.8). Furthermore, the 1946 election created a peculiar circumstance, where 
the Democrat Party was weaker than the other parties in the parliament; yet, it was 
compensated by a considerable following among the urban population. With this 
support base easily accessible, the messages of the Democrat Party’s anti-government 
campaigns resonated widely throughout Bangkok and quickly stoked public criticism of 
the government. By contrast, a majority of voters who had brought the Constitutional 
Front and the Cooperative to power lived far the political center and lacked access to 
the press to express their opinions. In all, the uncertainty of this political atmosphere 
began to erode the legitimacy of Thamrong’s government.  
Then came an eruption of corruption scandals. In May, the Democrats brought 
up the case of maladministration in the government's Food Drive Organization. 
Thamrong’s government had established the organization to manage the sale of cheap 
foodstuffs to the poor in February 1947. Yet, because of poor supervision, these public 
funds became lucrative sources for officials and politicians; even well-off people could 
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make false claims about their economic status to obtain subsidies. As this scandal 
simmered, the government faced two more allegations of embezzlement by its MPs. 
One case was related to the note exchange program (“November 8 Coup D’état 
Identifies 1947 as Year of Counter Revolution,” BKP, 31 December 1947, pp.11-12), and 
the other featured a public project to supply farming tools to peasants at below-market 
prices to boost agricultural production (“MPs Take Two Steps to Dissolve Parliament,” 
BKP, 12 July 1947, p.1). 
The Democrat Party pounced on these opportunities. It appointed members to 
investigate the cases and published reports aimed at impeaching the government (“On 
the Political Front,” BKP, 7 May 1947, p.8). Unlike before when Thamrong’s government 
was secured by the majority support of the Constitutional Front-Cooperative coalition, 
the Democrats’ motion now drew enough support to put pressure on the government. 
While Cooperative MPs vowed to support the government passively, meaning that they 
would not vote for or against any motions (“Sahacheep Faced by Rebellion – Members 
Vote only “Passive” Government Support,” BKP, 12 May 1947, p.1), many independent 
MPs sided with the Democrats to challenge the government (“MPs Take Two Steps to 
Dissolve Parliament,” BKP, 12 July 1947, p.1). Under these multipronged attacks, 
Thamrong dissolved his cabinet and formed a new one (“Premier Selected Thursday,” 
BKP, 28 May 1947, p.1). Nevertheless, his act did not solve the problem, but 
substantiated the rumors of Thamrong's downfall that persisted till the dying days of the 
Constitutional Front-Cooperative coalition. 
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Meanwhile, Pridi, the leader of the Constitutional Front, was trapped in another 
political misfortune. In June 1946, King Ananda was shot dead in his bedroom. Rumors 
pinned the blame on Pridi, although the causes of the King’s death were still 
unidentified. The conservatives and royalists believed that Pridi was competing for 
power against the monarchy. His  role in the 1932 Coup, his leftist tendencies, and his 
abounding political influence from his concurrent positions as both the sole Regent and 
the then Prime Minister,  raised suspicions that Pridi wanted to eliminate the King to 
consolidate  power.27  To avoid public resentment, Pridi allowed his deputy Thamrong to 
replace him as the Prime Minister after the general election of August 1946. Thamrong’s 
government promised to investigate the case, but after a year of lengthy investigation, 
the government’s Commission of Inquiry failed to produce any conclusive reports on the  
King’s death.28 As a last resort, the Thamrong government passed the case to the Police 
Department to open a new investigation (“Dramatic Political Story behind November 
Coup,” BKP, 31 December 1947, pp.5-8). Pridi resigned from the parliament in April 
1947.29 
The government’s indeterminate actions stirred speculation. Sensational stories 
about the “assassination” by Pridi and governmental cover-up circulated widely in the 
Bangkok press (“Dramatic Political Story behind November Coup,” BKP, 31 December 
                                                          
27
  According to the records of American diplomats in Bangkok, there were a lot of rumors about Pridi’s 
disregard acts towards the royal family when he was the Regent, his personal conflicts with King Ananda, 
and his pressures on King’s Ananda to form a Council of Regency as Pridi recommended. All tried to 
rationalize the rumor that Pridi directed the assassination of King’s Ananda (Yost, 1946 as cited in 
Suwannathat-Pian, 1996, p. 177). 
28
 A major obstacle to the investigation was that the royal family had cleaned up the accident scene and 
thus the Commission depended mostly on testimonials of members and staffs of the royal family 
(Simpson, 1978, chapter 13). 
29
 After resigning from the Prime Ministership in 1946, Pridi still hold the MP position. 
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1947, pp.5-8). This gave the opposition an opportunity to delegitimize the government. 
In August 1947, leading Democrats issued public statements accusing the government 
and Pridi of complicity in the King’s death.30 Coupled with grueling attacks from the 
opposition, a chain of unfortunate events put the coalition government of the 
Constitutional Front and the Cooperative on the verge of crisis by the end of 1947. The 
last parliament session was opened in November 1947 with Thamrong’s announcement 
about his government’s resignation.  
While political competition is not uncommon in democracies, the confrontation 
that ensued between the Democrat Party, on one side, and the Constitutional Front 
with the Cooperative, on the other side, went beyond normal party competition. 
Democrat leaders publicly declared that they would not join any coalition government 
with either because of their conflicting principles (Interview with Seni by BKP, 29 
January 1947, p.1). The Democrat Party wanted to oust not only Thamrong’s 
government, but also the Constitutional Front and the Cooperative. Yet, the party was 
not strong enough to do so through the ballot box. It also tried to gain support from 
independent MPs and defectors from other parties. Khuang and some other leading 
Democrats stood for the election for the Prime Ministership and the Presidency of the 
Lower House, but their attempts were denied by the Constitutional Front and the 
Cooperative with a large margin of votes against.31 In such a situation, Democrat leaders 
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 Democrats were fined by the Criminal Court for creating rumors in September 2 1947. Indeed, this trial 
became an excuse for the opposition to blame the government for arbitrary actions. (“November 8 Coup 
D’état Identifies 1947 as Year of Counter Revolution,” BKP, 31 December 1947, pp.5-8) 
31
 In election for the government in August 1946, Thamrong won with 133 votes, while Khuang got only 52 
votes (“Thamrong gets the Premier bid,” BKP, 22 August 1946, p.1). 
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faced a hard choice. They would need to accept the current situation of Thai democracy, 
regardless of its untidiness and the parties they disdained. Otherwise, they would have 
to resort to undemocratic means to remove the elected government. This decision 
Democrat leaders took would change the course of the party system and democracy in 
Thailand forever. 
4.3 The coincidences  
In the immediate post-war period, Thai politicians busily formed parties, 
designed a new political system and fought amongst each other for their political stakes 
in that new system. On the world stage, the Allied powers also struggled to define their 
international positions and construct a new world order. No sooner had WWII ended 
that it was followed by another war driven by the West. Divides split into the Capitalist 
and Communist camps. Along the way, colonial and post-colonial countries became 
hotbeds for Western powers to wield their influence and recruit allies to their cause. A 
remarkable feature of the events of 1947 was the coincidental timing of the crisis in the 
Thai parliament and these shifts in international relations.  
At the end of WWII, according to the peace conditions imposed by the British, 
Thailand would have to disarm its military, dissolve any political organizations and 
punish collaborators.32 Pridi and his allies in the government saw this as a chance to 
                                                                                                                                                                             
In the election for the President of the Lower House in May 1947, Democrat candidate lost to Cooperative 
candidate in a 51 one to 90 vote (“Opposition Loses Out in First House Test,” BKP, 12 May 1947, p.1). 
Khuang lost to Thamrong the second time because the Democrat got only 55 votes, when the parliament 
elected a new government after Thamron resigned in the end of May (“Premier Selected Thursday,” BKP, 
28 May 1947, p.1). 
32
 See the twenty-first points of the British (Peterson, 1946, pp. 367-368). 
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diminish the influence of the military and to eliminate Phibun permanently from the 
political scene. But Pridi asked the British to reduce their demands on rice deliveries 
from Thailand, given the economic hardships of postwar Thailand, and also to meet 
several requests of Thailand as a diplomatic exchange. The British, who needed massive 
rice supplies to rehabilitate its army in its Asian colonies, hesitated and put the 
agreement on hold. Amid this postponement in October 1945, the pre-war parliament 
of Thailand was dissolved and a new parliament would be formed in no less than ninety 
days before the government could present to the parliament any international 
agreements (Reynolds, 2005, pp. 394-395 and 407-409). 
If the two countries had been able to settle the treaty quickly, the military and 
Phibun would have been severely punished by the international procedures that the 
British recommended, and it most likely would have ended Phibun's political career. 
However, a delay of a few months proved costly. Domestically, some Thai diplomats 
believed that agreeing to British demands compromised Thai sovereignty. Seni, aiming 
to prevent Pridi from making these compromises, leaked the proposed treaty to the 
public to stoke a wave of criticism accusing Pridi of sacrificing Thailand’s national 
interests (Reynolds, 2005, pp. 399-400). Internationally, the United States was gaining 
superpower status, replacing that of the UK, and it wanted to change the old world 
order based on the colonial system of the great powers. The Americans thus did not 
expect the British to increase their influence on Thailand and use it as a base to regain 
their prewar position in Southeast Asia (Fineman, 1997, p. 25). Coincidentally, Seni and 
other Democrats had close contacts with American politicians because of their time 
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spent in Washington. Seni’s view towards the prospective treaty between Thailand and 
the UK was also in line with American interests. Thus, when the anti-British elements in 
the Thai government complained to their counterparts in the US about the imperialist 
treaty proposed by the British, they found sympathetic ears. The US Senate, for 
instance, threatened to postpone and to reconsider its billion dollar loan to Britain, if it 
did not stop intervening in Thailand’s domestic politics. Facing opposition from its 
creditor, Britain agreed to drop the request for an international trial of the Thai military 
leaders and for reorganizing the Thai government (Darling, 1963, pp. 104-106). 
The release of these military leaders would create tremendous consequences for 
Thai democracy. When the coalition government of the Constitutional Front and the 
Cooperative had their weaknesses exposed, the military leaders did not hesitate to plan 
their return. In mid- 1947, Phibun formed a party (Tharmathipart or “Right is Might” 
party) and announced his plan to contest for a government position (“Phibun Men 
Reported Active in Ayuthya,” BKP, 15 May 1947, p.1 and “Ex-Premier to Run for 
Election,” BKP, 21 June 1947, p.1). By late 1947, rumors about a coup by Phibun against 
Thamrong’s government were rife (“Premier’s Secretary in Denial,” BKP, 15 September 
15 1947, p.1 and “Political Leaders Discount Talk of Overturn of Government,” BKP, 16 
September 1947, p.1). 
While the ruling parties had failed to eliminate the military’s power, they did 
their utmost to deter military leaders from reentering politics. Members of the 
Constitutional Front and the Cooperative organized several public protests against their 
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prospective reentry (“Police Hold Pair Distributing Placards,” BKP, 5 April 1947, p.1). 
Internationally, Pridi lobbied the UK and the US governments to oppose the prospect of 
a military government in Thailand, and requested for them not to support any military 
factions which aimed for political power. The British, still angered by Phibun’s war 
declaration against the Allies and his nationalist policies that hurt British companies, 
easily found common interest with Pridi. Yet, the best that Britain could do was to issue 
a communiqué against Phibun. The US could have had a much stronger influence, 
because it was processing a ten million dollar loan for Thailand and had also promised 
aid to help reconstruct the Thai economy (Darling, 1963, p. 109). The US could have 
revoked its promises if the government did not meet the US’s demands. The British thus 
asked the US to cooperate with it against Phibun, but the US demurred. American 
leaders worried about Pridi's ties with the Communists and his pro-British trade policies. 
More importantly, American leaders made the decision to stand behind the Democrat 
Party rather than the Constitutional Front and the Cooperative. Seni convinced the 
American Ambassador to Bangkok and some Congressmen to accept a prospective 
military coup against an elected government. Khuang and Seni cooperated with the 
coup group with the condition that the Democrats would form the post-coup 
government. In its turn, the US would support any government formed by the 
Democrats.  In so doing, although the US did not publicly support the coup, it paved the 
way for Phibun’s return (Fineman, 1997, pp. 31-35). 
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4.4 A dark night for Thailand's parliamentary system   
On 9 November 1947, a military group led by Phibun staged a coup to remove 
Thamrong, Pridi and their party fellows from power. On the following day, this 
November Coup Group and the Democrat Party issued a statement condemning the 
corruption of Thamrong's government and the political instability it created. Pridi (and 
some of his fellows) fled into exile. Main members of the Constitutional Front and the 
Cooperative were charged with corruption and intrigue, and were barred from politics. 
Political suppression of Pridi’s friends and followers was harsher, after their 
aforementioned failed coup against the military government in 1949.33  These measures 
destroyed these young parties and their political support groups. 
In general, the Coup of 9 November was a consequence of several mutually-
reinforcing factors. The crisis of Thamrong’s government was the immediate cause. That 
the coup happened a day after Thamrong left his post suggested that the coup’s success 
was a reflection of the government ceasing to function as opposed to the military’s 
strength. The narrow escape of Phibun and his fellows from the international trial was a 
precondition. One may argue that the coup was only a matter of time, because the 
military had been dissatisfied with the government’s policies for reducing its budget, 
while also marginalizing Phibun’s supporters from decision-making. Nevertheless, the 
problem was that the military was not deprived to the point of incapacitation, which 
would have then forestalled a coup. The postwar government had politically sidelined 
                                                          
33
 Many former Free Thais, especially the northeastern politicians, were killed or imprisoned after the 
1949 rebellion (Keyes, 1967, p. 34). As Pridi was suspected a Communist, anybody which previously had 
political relations with him were harshly treated and banned from politics (King, 1954, p. 169). 
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the military, but was unable to put it fully under civilian control and destroy its power 
base. Adding to the above domestic conditions, the support from the Western powers 
cleared the way for Phibun to reassume power.  
When the military took its first steps back in politics, the course of Thailand's 
international relations opened a favorable environment for it to consolidate its power. 
Initially, concerned about negative international reactions to the coup, the November 
Coup Group34 did keep its promise to make the Democrats the ruling party. Yet, after 
the dust settled, the Coup Group thrust the Democrats aside and Phibun took over 
government in April 1948. Whilst Thailand was changing its government, the Cold War 
intensified and Communist forces were gaining ground in many colonies and 
postcolonial countries. Fearing that Thailand would be overrun by Communists without 
a strong government, the US and UK quickly recognized Phibun’s government (Fineman, 
1997, pp. 55-58). Phibun won the support of Western powers for his strong policies to 
close Thailand's borders from the Indochinese revolutionaries (Goscha, 1999, chapter 8). 
Influences of the Cold War continued to color Thai politics. In February 1949, for 
example, Pridi secretly returned from his exile in China to launch an unsuccessful 
rebellion against the military government. Afterwards, Pridi hid in Thailand for several 
months before leaving for China. In the same year, Mao's communists took control of 
China. This compelled foreign powers to suspect the former parties and other political 
forces that were connected to Pridi. The US affirmed its relationship with Phibun’s 
government to protect Thailand as a bastion of freedom against Communism. In the 
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 This name was commonly used by the then media, because the coup took place in November 1947. 
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memories of Edwin F. Stanton, the US Ambassador to Thailand from 1947 to 1953, 
American leaders were especially impressed by Phibun’s firm stance against the 
Communists, which stood in stark contrast with the indeterminacy of previous Thai 
governments. As a result, the US government agreed to increase military aid to Phibun's 
government (Stanton, 1954, pp. 82-83). This international recognition and financial 
assistance benefited the military at the expense of other political forces. It gained 
legitimacy as the national leader. Receiving sizable resources more than any other state 
institution, the military had considerable advantage in expanding and consolidating its 
power.35  
In all, the policies of the foreign powers towards Thailand greatly influenced the 
course of Thai politics in these transitional years. The US understandably would support 
any political force whose policies were in line with its international agenda. For 
Thailand, this meant the conservatives would ally with the superpower that had an 
incentive to replace the existing party system. The complementary interplay of domestic 
and international factors brought Thailand's first party system to an end.  
However, these courses of political events were avoidable. If the war criminals 
were executed, the US would have had no other choice but to help strengthen the 
civilian government to counter Communism, as it did in Japan. In another scenario, the 
later the coup attempt took place, the less likely it would have succeeded. The civilian 
                                                          
35
 After the abdication of King Prajadhipok until the late 1950s, the Thai monarchy wielded little 
influences in Thai politics, since the young King Ananda and his successor King Bhumibol lived overseas. 
More importantly, the first and the second governments of Phibun tried to limit the King’s role and put his 
allies in the Regent Council. For more details, see Handley’s book (2006) among others and also my 
analysis in the next chapter. 
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government might have had more time to consolidate its power, and the military might 
have been weaker over time because of its financial constraints. This means that a 
minor shift in time might have resulted in a different situation. However, the existence 
of the Democrat Party catalyzed the coincidence of these factors. Democrat Party 
leaders lobbied for the release of Phibun, mobilized against the ruling parties, and 
convinced the US to support its intrigue against a democratic government. The 
Democrat Party was a minor party without its own electoral base; yet, it had 
tremendous impact on the course of events because of the political skills of its leaders. 
The decision to resort to these actions was taken lightly by the Democrat 
leaders. Seni admitted that regardless of how bad Thamrong government performed, 
his coalition government was legally elected and thus still legitimate. However, 
Democrat leaders wanted a political order based on Thai tradition and a democracy 
under a “benevolent monarch,” which Pridi and the other two parties had pushed aside 
(Van Praagh, 1989, pp. 22, 99). This political order would have hardly been realized, if 
the Constitutional Front and the Cooperative had remained major parties in electoral 
constituencies and were continually reelected as the majority in parliament. Alas, 
Democrats’s calculations resulted in a victory for the military. After Phibun's coup, 
Khuang and Seni requested Phibun to retire from his military post; in the end, they were 
the ones who were forced to leave government in April 1948 (“Demands of Coup 
Leaders Cause of Government Act,” BKP, 7 April 1948, p.1). Their decisions stifled the 




4.5 Unfinished business   
The collapse of young parties left a vacuum in the political system. Parties that 
had the potential to grow and incorporate a large constituency were suppressed and 
crushed. The only surviving party was the Democrats. Yet, as the weakest party among 
the three, coupled with its conservative predilection for order over change, the 
Democrat Party chose to be a “loyal opposition” (1954, p. 173). It worked with, rather 
than against, the military government. Lacking political preferences, organization bases 
and social support, party politics were completely under the maneuver of the coup 
leaders.  
During Phibun’s rule from 1948 to 1957, while the government did not forbid 
any organized political forces to coalesce and did not rule out elections, parties existed 
merely at face value and were tightly controlled by the Police Department. Only those 
who supported Phibun or belonged to the armed forces were able to register for 
election, and the pro-government party Seri Manangasila (“Free Stone Seat” party) was 
the sole existing party. Yet, the Seri Manangasila was no more than the rubber stamp of 
the November Coup Group, and a banal title to disguise the crude political bargains 
between the coup leaders and political opportunists. It relied on rents, including 
ministerial posts and economic stakes, to buy off military officers and politicians outside 
the November Coup Group. MPs negotiated for higher economic benefits or 
government positions in return for their membership in the party. In such a situation, 
one could argue that the party system did not exist.  
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In 1956, an opportunity for the party system to resurrect was opened shortly 
when Phibun announced the liberalization plan in 1956 that led to an election in 1957. 
Nevertheless, such an opportunity was never realized, as Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat, a 
member of the November Coup Group, staged a coup to overthrow Phibun immediately 
following the 1957 elections. Sarit’s assumption to power opened an era of “despotic 
paternalism” (Thak, 1979) in which Sarit, different from Phibun, revived the monarchy, 
revitalized Thai traditions, outright proscribed parties and harshly suppressed political 
activities to consolidate his government.  
In hindsight, many aspects of the first party system from 1945 to 1948 grew from 
the parliamentary activities in the post-1932 period. The Free Thai movement and 
events of WWII reinforced early political patterns. Thus, after thirteen years of delay 
(1932-45), a multiparty system came into existence at the end of the war. Nevertheless, 
the antagonism between the parties that dominated this system attenuated its internal 
strength, allowing it to succumb to the military. The Democrats, for both noble and self-
serving reasons, allied with a military faction in the overthrow an elected government. 
Standing alone, the party easily, and perhaps predictably, lost the political initiative to 
the coup group.  
While the collapse of the first party system could be blamed largely on the 
mistakes of both the ruling and opposition parties, international events from late 1948 
worsened the problems for the ruling parties. The influences of the great powers on the 
"third world," their changing international positions and the ascendency of the Cold War 
77 
 
opened opportunities for a military government to resurrect itself. If the civilian 
government had been stronger, the great powers might have found a reliable partner; in 
this case, they might have supported it rather than the military. However, conflicts 
between parties weakened the collective strength of civilian forces. Hence, it might be 
more reasonable to argue that the confluence of several independent chains of events 





Chapter Five: The Legacies (1969-1979) 
Following the demise of Thailand's first party system in 1948, three despotic 
military leaders – Phibun Songkhram, Sarit Thanarat and Thanom Kittikachorn36 - ruled 
successively, and oppressively, until 1973.  This was especially so with the rise of Sarit in 
1957. He instituted martial law, banned all political associations, including political 
parties, and reinforced the 1952 Anti-Communist Activities Act.  He pursued even 
sterner policies against alleged Communists than Phibun. Comprised solely of Sarit’s 
handpicked military men, an appointed Constituent Assembly had no power but 
authorship of a pro-government constitution that denounced a Western-style 
parliamentary system, democracy and related political values (Thak, 1979, chapters 4 
and 5). Military rule disrupted the Thai party system for twenty one years from 1948 to 
1969.  
However, in 1969 the party system was regenerated by the political liberalization 
of Thanom, Sarit’s successor. This chapter analyzes the pattern of party reemergence 
during ten years political transition from 1969 to 1979. This pattern comprises three 
concurrent processes: (1) coordination among office-seekers in response to the 
reintroduction of elections, (2) adaptive choices of voters, and (3) emergent relations 
among parties, and between parties and other political institutions. I argue that 
outcomes of these three political processes were shaped by the legacies of Thailand’s 
first party system 1945-1948. The reemerging party system continued to be 
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 After staging a successful coup in November 1947, Phibun ruled until 1957. He was then overthrown by 
a member of his coup group, Sarit, in 1957. Thanom succeed Sarit in 1963, after Sarit’s sudden death. 
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characterized by factions and instability, reminiscent of the time after the first party 
system was overthrown by Phibun’s military coup. In the transitional years between 
1969 and 1979, the shortage of preexisting organized channels to incorporate office-
seekers into the political system, or particularly the deficiencies of political parties, 
resulted in the search for an alternative vote-collecting method that relied on 
personalistic networks and rents. This method enabled office-seekers to secure their 
victories in intensely competitive elections without much support from parties. Yet, 
costs for the party system were high. As a consequence of adaptive strategies, office-
seekers sought to build up personal power bases rather than party apparatuses; over 
time, they had few incentives to consolidate parties as effective, collective entities. 
It should be noted that I bypass much of the twenty-two year period of military 
rule. In large part, it is because of the fact that parties were marginalized during this 
time. As chapter four discussed, after the two main parties of the 1945-1948 period 
were dissolved, Phibun’s and Sarit’s coup juntas continued to search, imprison, execute 
and murder their leaders. While the military’s suppression shared the responsibility for 
destroying the process of building a party system, the roots of parties in society had 
been too shallow for parties to survive such political suppression. In reaction to military 
suppression, parties vanished rather than going underground. The lone survivor-- the 
Democrat Party -- chose silence and ceased to function. Thus, the nature of parties and 
their stage of development prior to their demise would influence the pattern of party 
reemergence.  In this light, this chapter mainly concerns the delayed effects of the 
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breakdown of the nascent party system in 1948, and the long-term consequences of this 
breakdown. 
This chapter begins by providing the context in which the military government 
re-opened elections and resurrected parties, followed by a focus on three episodes of 
party reemergence: 1) the 1969 reintroduction of competitive elections; 2) the peak of 
democratic transition from 1973 to 1976; and 3) the years between 1977 and 1979 
when the momentum of social movements gradually faded. This chapter concludes with 
a discussion of the significance of elections during the 1969-1979 period in the study of 
Thai parties and elections. 
5.1 The backdrop 
Since the 1960s, the Thai society had undergone dramatic changes, and existing 
political institutions were unable to absorb such changes to maintain order and stability. 
The politics of a highly centralized administrative system, dating from the 1890s, 
appeared incompatible with a pluralized society. Despite his harsh political rule, Sarit's 
policies helped to foster economic growth in Thailand that groomed local businesses. 
While capitalists benefited from their personal relations with military leaders and the 
pro-business policies of the military governments, their assertiveness and their 
independence thrived in line with the accumulation of their wealth (Suehiro, 1992, p. 
146; Surin, 1997). In addition to the rise of the capitalist class, the middle class also grew 
as a result of an expansion in education.  This middle class unlike its predecessors, was 
educated in improved local universities, which resulted in higher levels of political 
conscious   (Anderson, 1977; Jim Ockey, 1999, pp. 234-239). At a lower social spectrum, 
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the poorer working class also emerged out of industrialization and urbanization (Morell 
& Chai-anan, 1981, chapter 4). In the late 1960s, Communist insurgencies government 
counterinsurgencies drew remote rural areas into national politics (Anderson, 1990, pp. 
37-38). On the whole, not only had the fabric of Thai society been altered, but the 
expectations of various social groups towards their relations with the central state also 
changed. This created a demand for alternative communication channels between state 
and society. Theoretically, political parties could rise up to fulfill this role.  
The new social context thus appeared conducive for the return of parties. Vocal 
university students idealistically cheered parties and elections.37 Workers organized 
unions, and peasants joined grass-root associations.38 During the 1970s, social 
movements proliferated, politicized and polarized along the left-right dimension. 
Thailand experienced an extraordinary period of social activism, which provided social 
bases for parties potentially to develop. Parties could expand from the elitist groups to 
the masses, which would then be a main component of civil society (Katz & Mair, 1995, 
pp. 10-11). If such a hypothetical process indeed happened, parties would help 
incorporate the masses into the political system. In so doing, parties would also 
transform themselves from cadre to mass-based ones, and they would gradually root 
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During the liberalization under Thanom, students at Thammasat and Chulalongkorn universities 
organized political studies groups published magazines and organized discussions on political issues and 
showed their support for the parliamentary system (Girling, 1981, pp. 142-145).  
Student groups held public talks for parties to introduce themselves to the student voters in the 1975 
electoral campaigns, and organized observation at electoral booths. See the Bangkok Post from 
November to December 1974 and January 1975. 
38
 Rural grass root groups were organized either by the Communist Party of Thailand or by the state 
agencies, such as the Border Patrol Police, in respond to the expansion of the Communist Party of 
Thailand in the country side. Depending on whom helping them to organize, these grass root associations 
could lean to the right or the left (Saiyud, 1986). 
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themselves in society. Accordingly, party system would solidify over time (Sartori, 1976, 
p. 19). 
In conjunction with such emergence of demands and supplies for the functioning 
of a political party system, the military’s waning power opened opportunities for parties 
to reclaim their roles. The junta had been using the symbolic support of the monarchy 
to legitimize their power, but King Bhumibol Adulyadej increasingly disengaged himself 
from Thanom’s government, which had become unpopular because of allegations of 
corruption. In his address to Thammasat University students in 1967, for the first time, 
the King broke an unwritten rule about the monarchy’s neutrality in politics by publicly 
denouncing the government for corruption and dishonesty (Darling, 1969, p. 121; 
Handley, 2006, p. 205). Apart from losing its political ally, the coup group gradually 
broke up from within, when army officers, being politicized and engaging in too many 
economic activities, transformed into conflicting “interest groups.” Also, many original 
members of the 1957 coup group retired and their positions were replaced by younger 
military officers (Chai-Anan, 1982, pp. 14-22, 27-30).  
The military government was further weakened by internal personal rifts. As 
support for Thanom hemorrhaged, he gambled by legalizing elections in an attempt to 
broaden his external base of support. Thanom's miscalculation forced him into exile in 
1973. As a result, the military had momentarily lost direction; officers sought power via 
the new electoral game and many did so successfully.  
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With the military retreating, the political space opened for other actors to 
compete for leadership and establish new rules of the game. Within a given political 
space, whoever is faster and bolder to take earlier steps could have more competitive 
advantages in determining such rules (Schmitter, 1992). During the political 
liberalization beginning in 1969, parties and the monarchy appeared as main 
competitors for representing popular sovereignty. While the monarchy might benefit 
from a fifteen-year head start in promoting its image in the public thanks to Sarit’s 
policy to revive the monarch’s symbolic authority (Thak, 1979, pp. 311-334), it did not 
mean the monarchy would outright be considered a representative of people who 
would demanded democracy and participation in the political system. Formally, in 
democracy, political parties are the only entity channeling social interests into the 
policy-making process through elections. Thus, theoretically, political parties have an 
advantage in a democratized political system. In the case of Thailand, whether parties or 
the monarchy could realize their advantages and consolidate their political position as 
the representatives of popular sovereignty would depend on the responses of each side 
to the political transition. At the opening of the political transition, one could hardly 
foresee which side would successfully rise to the helm. 
In all, conditions were relatively favorable for a consolidated party system to 
emerge. The path Thai system would follow rested upon responses and choices of 
office-seekers and their emerging parties once opportunities were open. If they failed, it 




5.2 The re-incorporation of parties to the Thai political process 
 
In late 1968, Thanom promulgated a new constitution, which substantively 
liberalized the political system and paved the way for a political transition that went 
beyond his anticipation. According to the constitution, the government would be 
formed through elections. Yet, Thanom tried to ensure that elections and an elected 
legislature would support him. For starters, elections were limited to the lower house 
(House of Representatives). The Prime Minister, leader of the largest party in the lower 
house, reserved the authority to appoint members of the upper house (Senate). At the 
time, Thanom’s government quickly formed United Thai People’s Party (UTPP), 
comprised of military officers in the then Constituent Assembly. With the prospect that 
the UTPP would win the majority, making Thanom the Prime Minister with a popular 
mandate, and that both the lower and upper houses would be under the control of the 
Prime Minister, Thanom expected to gain more power rather than lose it. 
The UTPP was unsurprisingly the largest party in term of resources and 
members. Under the patronage of the military government, it had liberal access to state 
funds and public media. It could also rely on local state officials to assist its electoral 
campaigns. Yet, these advantages did little to fortify party organization. As the cipher of 
the military, the UTTP suffered from deleterious factionalism.  
The drafting of the Electoral Law and the Party Act following the promulgation of 
the new constitution in 1968 reflected the UTPP’s internal problems. The party had 128 
representatives on the 164-members law drafting committee. It was thus able to exert 
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its influences on the party system’s future shape. Nevertheless, hidden under the 
dominant party façade was genuine factionalization.  UTPP members of the committee, 
for instance, rejected Thanom’s recommendations that legislature candidates had to run 
under party names and each party had to present a party list for each province-wide 
constituency. Instead, the drafters negotiated for a law in which candidates could run on 
their own in single or multiple-member constituencies (Neher, 1970a).39 Here, individual 
interests trumped collective interests in the drafting process. As those politicians were 
attracted to the party by promises of patronage, money, and access to power, they had 
no common interest in building a strong party. They preferred to maintain their freedom 
to maneuver politically, while still enjoying such benefits brought by their party 
affiliation as funds and political offices (Neher, 1970a, pp.245-246).  Blocking the 
development of a centralized leadership would help maximize politicians’ individual 
interests, when the UTPP continued to be the government party under the auspices of 
the military. The feeble electoral law would allow any ambitious politician of the party 
to register and compete for legislative positions. It freed party members from 
organizational constraints, which otherwise would result from the control of the 
candidate selection process (Bowler, 2000). This also meant that parties, as 
organizations, would lose their power over their members in the long term. Parties, as 
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 In single-member constituencies, voters case one choice. In multi-member constituencies, voters can 
choose many candidates from different parties.  
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collective entities, would be fragile, since members of the same parties directly 
competed against each other for votes.40 
On the eve of the 1969 election, parties on the left and the right quickly 
emerged. Although many of them had a history that could be traced back to the first 
party system, their resources and organizations were too meager for them to effectively 
compete. Leftist parties formed an alliance called the Economic United Front (EUF), 
whose members shared a common origin from the former Cooperative Party; the 
fortunes and misfortunes of their predecessor influenced their subsequent fate. The 
EUF inherited strongholds in the countryside, especially in the north. However, this was 
also its weakness. As the Cooperative had collapsed and its remnants were harshly 
suppressed by Phibun and Sarit before it could expand beyond its home region, survivals 
of the Cooperative and other leftist parties revived their parties with limited 
organizational reach. Their support bases were even narrower than they once were, 
because of the competition from the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT). Despite 
working outside legal, mainstream politics, the CPT gained strength in the 1960s thanks 
to assistance from Communists in neighboring countries; it accumulated support from a 
sizeable portion of the peasantry in northern and southern Thailand (Bowie, 1997, p. 
68). 
Among right-wing opposition parties, only the Democrat Party seemed able to 
compete with the UTPP, partly because of its survival of a complete purge by the 
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 The open list multi-member constituencies using the plurality voting is called “multiple-vote system.” 
This system has low coordination effects on candidates, and thus does not support party’s coherence 
(Cox, 1997, pp. 194-196). 
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military government. Continuously financed by its old members, the Democrat Party 
was able to maintain its activities, though limited to a small group of mostly Bangkokian 
elites, and to quickly revive its organization once Thanom legalized parties (Morell, 
1974, p. 228). The party showed its popularity in the 1968 Bangkok municipal election, 
in which it won twenty-two out of twenty-four contested seats.41 It also had a larger 
number of members than other opposition parties which campaigned in 1969. However, 
the reach of the Democrat Party was confined mainly to Bangkok and some southern 
provinces, and the party was struggling to expand beyond its traditional bases because 
of financial shortage (p. 228). 
The events of 1969 transformed Thai politics. As was discussed in earlier 
chapters, Thai politics was highly centralized, creating a deep divide between the capital 
Bangkok and the countryside. The policies of the military governments intensified these 
fault lines.  Economically, state capital was channeled to the industries located in the 
Bangkok metropolitan area,42 ignoring the vast rural provinces. Politically, the 
centralized administrative system empowered the central bureaucracy vis-à-vis the 
regions (Girling, 1981, pp. 63-79, 135-139). Communist insurgencies further 
marginalized the frontier provinces that were put under heavy military surveillance 
(Bowie, 1997, p. 73). Such economic and political structures resulted in a Bangkok-based 
political core, of which both politicians and political audience resided mostly in Bangkok. 
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 See footnote 35 for the difference between the administrations of Bangkok and of other provinces. 
According to this system, the first municipal election in Bangkok took place in September 1968 (Electoral 
reports in BKP, 3 January 1969, p.1). 
42
 The Bangkok metropolitan area included Bangkok and five surrounding provinces -- Nonthaburi, Samut 
Prakan, Pathum Thani, Nakhon Pathom and Samut Sakhon. 
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Bangkok-based politicians had limited knowledge of rural folks, while the latter knew 
little of the former. This relationship bode ill for the country’s new politics. To win a 
national election such as the one in 1969, office-seekers and their parties had to look 
beyond the Bangkok metropolitan area. They were forced to stretch their reach and 
discover new political territories. 
Yet, the lax electoral laws disadvantaged parties when they did so.  Because new 
office-seekers could run independently, they had little motivation to join parties. Only 
those who aimed for the top government positions, such as prime minister and other 
ministerial posts, needed support of a majority party, which would help them form or 
join the government. This created unequal bargaining power among national politicians, 
central party bosses, and local politicians. Central party bosses needed local politicians 
rather than vice versa.  
Among registered parties, the UTPP had the most urgent need and the largest 
amount of resources to recruit new members to maintain its incumbent position. During 
the campaign, Thanom promised to fund any rural politician who joined. Electoral 
victors would receive ample funds for local development projects (Neher, 1970a, p.250). 
Other parties expectedly could not recruit new political candidates to campaign outside 
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their home base.43 Thus, for the 1969 election, only the UTPP listed candidates in most 
constituencies.44 
Another problem was the long candidate list, which proved confusing for rural 
voters.45 If parties are supposed to provide the information shortcut for voters, and thus 
to help reduce the information cost of voting (Aldrich, 1995, chapter 2), Thai parties 
were ill-prepared for this function. The candidate list also weakened the identification 
between voters and parties. When voters encountered a list of multiple politicians, they 
predictably choose local candidates with whom they were more familiar (BKP, 20 
January 1969, p.5). When parties were fairly obscure, the candidate list and its effect on 
voting behaviors would forge an alignment of voters with individual politicians, rather 
than with parties, in the long run. 
The 1969 election showed a party system in transition. Its lack of “partyness” 
and “systemness” manifested itself first in the campaigns of parties and then in the 
overwhelming victories of independent candidates. Affiliated to Thanom and the 
military, the UTPP suffered from a negative reputation among the public. As a result, its 
party leaders had to capitalize on individual reputation of party candidates rather than 
project a common party identity, and relied on house-to-house campaigns of 
candidates, rather than using mass rallies to reach a wider population (Morell, 1974, pp. 
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 See Reports on the electoral campaign on (“Home News,” BKP, from November to December 1968, 
p.5). 
44
 The UTPP had 219 candidates placed in almost every constituency of all the provinces. Democrat Party 
had 192 candidates, but did not have enough members outside Bangkok. Thus, Democrat Party could not 
submit the candidate list in the first call for registration of the Ministry of Interior. Data compiled from 
BKP, January 1969 
45
 Electoral reports in (BKP, 19 January 1969, p. 12 and 20 January 1969, p.5). 
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269-270). Worse still, except being funded by the central leadership, candidates almost 
worked on their own during the campaign. With limited time available to develop party 
branches, the UTPP’s central leaders recruited candidates together with their local vote 
canvassing networks or rural leaders to canvass votes for the party. Thus, candidates 
relied on their local networks for cultivating support from villagers; party canvassers 
knew only individual politicians they worked directly with rather than being familiar with 
the party as a whole (Morell, 1974, p.201). When the electoral results were announced, 
the UTPP had won less than a majority of seats, and independent candidates collected 
thirty-three percent of votes and comprised the second largest grouping in the lower 
house. As the 1969 election proved, economic rents could do little to cement party 
affiliation. To maintain a majority in the lower house in the face of party members’ 
defection, Thanom had to keep “buying” independent politicians (Morell, 1974, p. 759). 
It was no surprise then that his prime ministership rested on an unstable coalition. 
Given these superficial alliances, Thanom could neither control the voting of the 
UTPP’s members in the lower house nor expect to retain party members until the next 
election. Thanom’s plan to use the party and the election to strengthen his position 
flopped.  Many UTPP members voted against his policies and showed little commitment 
to the UTPP. As a result, Thanom’s government teetered on the verge of crisis just two 
years after the election. Opposition parties called for a constitutional change, and the 
“Young Turk” faction within the UTPP joined the opposition to demand more 
independence for the lower house (Neher, 1970b).  
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More damningly, the election empowered factions within the UTPP. When the 
military government had been able to rule by force, factions exchanged their support 
for Thanom for economic and political benefits. Competition had been contained within 
limits, as none of the factions had sufficient power and legitimacy to rule alone. Yet, 
with the arrival of elections, these factions could build up their own support bases in the 
electorate, and could use the electoral support that they cultivated as a source of power 
to bargain with Thanom. Moreover, through the ballot box, these factions could aim at 
competing with the Thanom’s faction for the premiership.  
In this context, many factions tactically sided with the Praphat Charusathien's 
faction. He was the number two military leader after Thanom, so as to bargain with 
Thanom for more benefits.  Others threatened to leave the UTPP (Neher, 1970b, 
pp.161-168). When Thanom’s government appeared losing its popularity, defections 
happened more frequently. Praphat-Thanom competition became more apparent, even 
though they were personally connected by the marriage of their children (Morell, 1974, 
p.758-759).  Thus, unexpectedly, the 1969 election weakened, rather than 
strengthened, Thanom’s position.  
In all, legacies of the party system’s failures in the first period (1945-1948) 
already haunted the first steps in the reemergence of a party system in 1969. Parties 
reemerged as they were at the time of political incidents in 1948. The Democrat Party 
was confined to Bangkok, and leftist parties resided mostly in the northeast in terms of 
both organization and electoral support. The newly established UTPP failed to play the 
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role of a ruling party. Without a preexisting party structure, coupled with their 
inexperienced in organizing party and challenges from internal struggles, military 
leaders could not sustain the UTPP and make it the dominant player in the party system. 
Across all parties, the lack of supporting organization and party reputation hindered 
coordination among office-seekers. Parties and their central leaderships had to rely on 
individual candidates for votes and survival more than the other way round; meanwhile, 
office-seekers were left on their own to campaign. The signs of disarray seemed to 
overwhelm those of structure and hinder the task of consolidating parties and stabilizing 
the party system.   
5.3 Parties on the sideline: party coordination in the constitution-making 
1973 
Losing support from his own party members, in November 1971, Thanom staged 
a coup to disband the lower house and all parties. Opposition parties had no significant 
reaction against the unlawful action that dispossessed them of their political rights. The 
upcountry and leftist EUFP understandably could not have a strong voice in the capital. 
The Democrat Party was what it had been during the first multiparty system – namely, a 
party of conservative, high-minded elites. Rather than standing up or trying to anchor 
the party within the student movement, for their safety, Democrat leaders chose to 
criticize the government as well-respected individuals. It was students who led a 
massive movement in 1973 to overthrow the military regime, whereas parties stood on 
the sideline (Darling, 1974, pp.5-19). 
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Playing limited role in the transition, political parties were under-representative 
in the drafting of a new constitution in 1973. The appointed National Convention 
elected an interim parliament to pass a new constitution.46 Even with a small number in 
the drafting committee, politicians from parties of the former parliament could not 
coordinate among themselves to push for collective interests of parties and elected 
politicians vis-à-vis other political groups.  This was because these politicians first and 
the foremost did not see themselves as representatives of parties and party interests 
(Morell & Chai-anan, 1981, p. 107). 
Thus, while the 1974 Constitution had many points that were more “democratic” 
than its 1968 counterpart, it did not favor the consolidation of the party system. The 
1974 Constitution abolished the position of permanent MP and concurrent tenure as 
both MPs and state officials. It also eliminated the power of the executive to control and 
intervene into the legislature. With regards to elections, all candidates had to run for 
election with a registered party. Another reform which would have an impact on party-
voter relations was the redrawing of constituencies. Rather than province-wide 
constituencies, populous provinces that would have more than three representatives in 
the lower house were divided into smaller constituencies. Compared to the 1969 
election, the number of province-wide single member constituencies was fewer.47 The 
smaller constituencies, it was hoped, would provide an incentive for parties to establish 
closer relationships with the grassroots electorate. Nevertheless, constitution drafters 
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 The National Convention had 2,300 members whom were appointed by the King according to their 
sectors and education levels. These members chose among themselves 299 members for the interim 
legislature (Race, 1975a). 
47
 There were nineteen province-wide single member constituencies in 1969 and eleven in 1975. 
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resisted any further motions that would grant parties more power over their candidates. 
The freedom of candidates to register, list and campaign against their party members 
remained intact as in the previous election. Political parties also felt short of becoming 
the only representative institution in the political system. Instead, the monarchy 
reserved the special power to appoint the Senate that was responsible for reviewing 
laws submitted by the lower house  (Race, 1975b, pp.157-158). 
5.4 The second trial of political parties  
The new Constitution generated little consolidating effects on the party system. 
Although several rules changed, as discussed above, there were few parties available to 
incorporate office-seekers and to coordinate them in a comprehensive electoral 
process.  Elections in 1975 and 1976 saw a surge of new office-seekers. Some were a 
result of the UTPP’s dissolution, which created a number of floating office-seekers 
looking for new parties to endorse their candidacy. Many bureaucrats-turned-politicians 
sought power through the ballot box, for they no longer enjoyed the privileges of 
concurrent positions. Simultaneously, the retreat of the military opened political space 
for many new elite groups, the majority of whom were businessmen, lawyers and 
journalists, to participate in politics (Morell & Chai-anan, 1981, pp. 116-117). However, 
there was simply a shortage of parties, especially in the center and on the right. The 
Democrat Party was the only centrist party, but it had already recruited a sizable 
amount of new elites following the previous election. In a competitive system, office-
seekers would be unlikely to form a single broad coalition, regardless of the chance for 
that coalition to win, because the larger the coalition, the smaller share each member 
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could finally get (Riker, 1962). Thus not all rational office-seekers would join the 
Democrats. This led to the formation of numerous new parties.  
The lack of organizational support, coupled with the large number of players, 
hindered coordination among office-seekers.48 Politicians easily left their parties 
because of personal conflicts. When a number of similar parties were recruiting new 
members, defection was possible. Moreover, since parties and individual politicians 
were new to the electorate, the cost differential between forming a new party and 
joining an existing one was negligible. Therefore, it was no surprise that small, new 
parties proliferated as campaigns unfolded. No fewer than forty-two parties, up from 
the initial ten that registered with the Ministry of Interior, appeared on the 1975 ballot 
(BKP, 1 December 1974, p.5). 
Even the Democrats split into four smaller parties.  In an environment where 
most politicians with sufficient reputation and finances could easily found their own 
party, ambitious Democrats could realize their political fortunes more quickly by leading 
their own parties than by waiting for their turn to be nominated as party leaders. The 
first prominent member to leave was Kurit Pramot, a founding member who formed the 
Social Action Party.  The brother of Seni Pramot, Kurit was a wealthy banker, a vocal 
journalist critical of the Thanom government, and a member of the 1974 Constitution 
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drafting committee. These factors gave him the confidence to form and lead his own 
party.49  
Compared to the 1969 election, the political stage was far more competitive in 
1974 and in 1975. Not only did a large number of new players surge into the electoral 
race, but also the use of media, public rallies and speeches was also no longer restricted. 
These factors ignited electoral campaigns. Without state funding or any legal limitation 
on how to campaign, the heightened competition pushed political parties into a 
spending race that sought to attract voters at any costs. In other words, greater 
competition meant higher financial costs. 
Fledging parties faced problems with their miniscule political reputations and 
budgets. Instead of functioning as campaign organizations assisting political candidates 
with resources and communication channels, parties urgently needed leadership and 
support to survive. Consequentially they had to align with the politico-economic elites 
who had available finance, contacts and recognition. In the transitional years, military 
officers accumulated substantial political capital. Subsequently, parties approached the 
old elites, and many military elites reincarnated themselves as party bosses. Illustrative 
were General Sa-nga Kittikachom, who funded the Social Agrarian Party; General Prava 
Poonvivat, who ran for the Democracy Party against Seni of the Democrat Party; 
General Kris Savana, who donated to several parties, and four military generals led by 
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Pramarn Adireksarn, who organized the Thai Nation Party. While political parties need 
funds and often capitalize on personal fame of their leaders, whether capital and 
personalities are the tools of campaigns or vice versa depends on the strength of party 
organizations (Farrell & Webb, 2000). These fledging organizations disadvantaged new 
Thai parties and led to the personal control of political elites. 
Since parties relied on political patrons for their electoral victories and they did 
not contribute much to the political success of their members, parties lacked 
independence. The authority of their central executive committees was also limited. 
Efforts to build party programs were often undermined by personal or group interests. 
At the height of social mobilization in the mid-1970s, some party leaders tried to engage 
activist groups and develop social support bases for their parties, but party members 
were not keen on their parties’ policies.  Worse, party leadership fell victim to social 
polarization.  On one side, antimilitary groups called for the investigation of the 
corruption cases of military officers and their capitalist cronies, labor unions wanted 
higher wages, and peasants demanded land. On the other side, political elites viewed 
social activism as a threat to their power (Girling, 1981, pp. 201-204). Central party 
leadership was too weak to reconcile conflicts between wealthy party donors and the 
majority voters. Parties, as a result, failed to serve as the bridge between the state and 
society in these critical years. 
In the 1976 election, the moderate and centrist Democrats won a plurality, 
partly because many voters felt intimidated by both the leftist and rightist parties, and 
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thus they made a safe choice amidst an unstable political condition (Girling, 1981, p. 
206). However, within the Democrats, an increasing gap between its liberal and 
conservative wings grew. The ascendency of progressive politicians who strongly 
supported social reforms worried the conservative faction led by well-known 
Bangkokian Democrats.50 The former helped the party expand its organization to the 
countryside within only two years. They also attempted to change the Democrats’s 
Bangkok-centered structure by replacing the universal voting system, which was open to 
all party members, with a new system which would be limited to only branch 
representatives.51 Afraid of losing power to the liberal group, the conservative 
Bangkokian group vetoed many proposals of the progressive camp (Girling, 1981, p. 
206). The support for Democrats and their government fell as support for the central 
leadership was withdrawn from all sides and internal conflicts cumulated in paralysis. 
While parties faced grave difficulties in trying to establish roots in society, 
individual politicians fared well under the turbulent political context. They infiltrated 
social movements and exploited social conflicts to strengthen their power. Conservative 
politicians, especially those from the Thai Nation Party, mobilized Village Scout groups 
as their electoral bases in the countryside (Bowie, 1997, p. 126). The political 
mobilization was so effective that these candidates won in almost all rural 
constituencies where they registered, although their parties lost Bangkok to the 
                                                          
50
 The conservatives were led by Thammanun Thienngern and Samak Sunthorawetwej, the two successive 
Bangkok’s governors. The leaders of the progressive faction included Damrong Lathiphiphat, the then 
Democrat’s secretary-general, Surin Masadit and Chuan Leekpai, both from the Southern provinces.  
51
 In the voting system based on party’s branch representatives, Bangkokian representatives would 
become the minority vis-à-vis provincial branch representatives (Morell & Chai-anan, 1981, pp. 268-269). 
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Democrats. Moreover, they could also rally conservative movements - Nawaphon, Red 
Gaur and Village Scout – against the Kukrit and Seni governments (Bowie, 1997, p.322). 
Conservative politicians held the advantage, because they had built relatively 
strong political networks in the countryside following the 1969 election. Most 
conservative politicians running for election in 1975 and 1976 had benefited because of 
their former membership in the defunct UTPP. They used electoral funds granted by 
Thanom's government to finance local projects in order to strengthen relationships with 
rural voters. Many politicians maintained these contacts even after elections were 
banned. Villagers had also learnt that they could access government funds and voice 
their concerns through these politicians (BKP, 22 December 1972, p.5). After the military 
regime fell and social movements emerged nationwide, opportunistic politicians quickly 
took advantage of their existing relations with villagers to infiltrate these social 
movements. By sponsoring public events of villages and patronizing Village Scouts, they 
could advertise and campaign for themselves (Bowie, 1997, pp. 125-127). 
Unfortunately, what was good for politicians was bad for parties. Because of the 
dissolution of the UTPP, its former members could independently manage the grants 
that they had received from the UTPP government (or more precisely the Thanom 
government) and could take full credit for their work in local constituencies. When 
parties returned to the political scene, politicians did not consider developing 
centralized electoral machinery because they had already had direct access to the local 
electorate. Once clientelistic networks had become an important tool for electoral 
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victory, politicians sought to reinforce these networks. Furthermore, while trying to 
strengthen their personal networks with the local electorate, politicians also 
simultaneously prevented the incorporation of voters into parties. In doing so, they did 
not need to sacrifice their politico-economic interests for electoral victory, but their 
parties were unable to establish their reputation in society.  
Electoral clientelism also minimized any efforts of parties to address social 
problems and strengthen connections between the ruling parties and the electorate. 
This phenomenon could be shown in the execution of Tambon Development Fund 
initiated by Kukrit’s government. Aiming to work more effectively and closely with local 
people, Kukrit bypassed the state bureaucracy and delegated fund and project 
management to members of the Social Action Party and others in the coalition 
government (Morell, 1976, p. 127). This good intention, however, undermined, rather 
than strengthened, the ruling party coalition. As parties had no direct connection with 
voters and few local branches, the funds were eventually managed by local networks of 
individual politicians and thus benefited them more than the whole parties and the 
central leaderships.  With continuous a money supply and projects in the name of their 
local electorate, politicians could reinforce their reputation and consolidate their rural 
clientelistic networks. As these networks became more ingrained, the harder it would 
be for parties to dislodge them in the long run.  
Overall, electoral politics from 1973 to 1976 demonstrated the failure of parties 
to incorporate office-seekers and voters into the political system. While coordination 
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among office-seekers remained as futile as the first three years of political liberalization 
(1969-1971), it became more apparent in the 1975 and 1976 elections; communication 
between parties and voters were largely restricted by the lack of ready local offices as 
well as parties’ “brand names.”  Voters adapted well to this situation by turning their 
support to individual office-seekers whom were known to deliver funds and projects to 
local constituencies and served as communicators between the countryside and the 
central government. Relations between central party leadership, other office-seekers 
and voters were maintained through clientelistic networks that developed as an 
alternative to party organization. 
5.5 The end of a transition 
When a country experiences an abrupt transition, resulting in a period of high 
uncertainty, a strong executive authority is an important factor for a smooth 
establishment of democratic rules (Dahl, 1971, p. 220). This type of executive authority, 
however, did not materialize in Thailand after two consecutive elections. Given the 
party system’s fragmentation, the parliaments of 1975 and 1976 rested on a fragile 
base. No government could be expected to last long. In 1975, the Democrats won the 
largest number of seats, but not enough to form a government alone. The first coalition 
government led by the Democrats survived only two weeks before it was taken over by 
Kukrit’s Social Action Party. However, Kukrit, although a skillful politician, could not 
manage a sixteen-party coalition government for a full term. The 1976 election, 
following the dissolution of Kukrit’s government, brought the Democrats an apparent 
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plurality. Yet, the resulting parliament remained far from cohesive and was deemed to 
fail from the beginning. 
Indecisiveness and paralysis characterized the two governments formed by 
democratic rules in 1975 and 1976. Thailand had experienced a period fraught with 
political anxieties since the mid-1970s. Political conflicts and social unrest occurred in 
conjunction with the dramatic changes in neighboring countries. The victory of 
Communist parties in Indochina by late 1975 raised fears about the “domino effect” in 
Thailand. The monarchy was particularly frightened by the changes taking place 
surrounding Thailand. The Cambodian King was exiled, and the Laotian monarchy was 
overthrown by the Communists. In Thailand, the expansion and the escalation of attacks 
from the CPT seemed to affirm the anxiety of the monarchy and the conservatives.52 
Amid these crises, the government was almost paralyzed because of the rising conflicts 
between the government and the parliament.53 Both Seni’s and Kukrit’s coalition 
governments appeared too feeble to calm society and to gain the confidence of main 
power-holders. As John Girling put it, “time and energy were spent either on political 
infighting or on tactical devices to keep the government alive at the expense of 
grappling with the really deep-rooted problems” (Girling, 1981, p. 197). 
                                                          
52
 In 1975, it claimed having 3.6 millions members. By 1977, the Communist Party existed in fifty two out 
of seventy two provinces, and killed 1475 government troops just in one year from 1976 to 1977 (Bowie, 
1997, p. 137). 
53
 Seni had to reshuffle his cabinet in order to delay the call for his resignation from the parliament. 
Because of the selection of cabinet members and the voting process to form the cabinet, the government 
could not work as usual (Darling, 1978). 
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Intolerant of the prolonged social disorder, the conservatives and a group of 
military officers staged a coup in October 1976 with the implicit support of the 
monarchy (Girling, 1981, p. 214; Morell & Chai-anan, 1981, p. 270). They then 
established a hybrid regime that combined the appointed Prime Minister with an 
elected lower house. They expected that the Prime Ministers and their governments 
might work more efficiently when they were independent from the electorate and did 
not owe their power to any parties (Kramol, 1979). 
After the coup, the rightists gained political strength as parties on the left 
waned. For the past two elections, support for leftist parties had been shrinking because 
of the costs of elections. The CPT also began to weaken in 1978.54 This decline created a 
number of floating voters, particularly in northern strongholds. Meanwhile, the right-
wing government boosted the confidence of the business class and encouraged more 
businessmen to enter politics. The 1979 election saw the last wave of political 




                                                          
54
 The Chinese Communist Party and the Communist Party of Vietnam reduced their assistance to the 
Communist Party of Thailand in 1978. The decline of the Communist Party was also a result of the Thai 
government’s changing policies toward it. Beginning in 1978, the government granted amnesty to 
students who had fled to the up-country and joined the Communist Party because of the bloody clashes 
with the rightist movements and the military in 1976. For detailed explanation (Bowie, 1997, pp. 274-276; 
Girling, 1981, pp. 246, 283).  
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Figure 2: The number of businessmen elected to the Lower House55 
 
 
The 6 October Coup, however, did not disrupt the political patterns coalescing in 
the electoral process. In the 1979 election, for instance, clientelism continued to benefit 
parties, and became the most likely important source of electoral success. The Social 
Action Party, the Thai Nation Party and the Thai People Party, whose candidates were 
the main beneficiaries of Kukrit’s development fund and main activists in the rightist 
movements, won the largest number of parliamentary seats.56 Although the right-wing 
movements declined in the late 1970s, the system of personal contacts between voters 
and politicians survived.  
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 See “Thailand: House of Representatives” in (Inter-parliamentaryUnion) retrieved from 
http://www.ipu.org/parline/reports/2311_A.htm last accessed on 15 July 2011.  
56
 The Social Action Party won the greatest number of seats (83); the Thai Nation Party ranked the second 
with 38 seats; and the third largest party in the legislature was the Thai People Party with 32 seats. The 
Thai People Party was the new party led by Samak, a former prominent member of the Democrats. The 
Democrat Party also had 32 seats. 















Nevertheless, the strength of these parties was superficial, which could be 
illustrated by the relationship between parties and local politicians in the 1979 national 
election and in the 1980 local one. Whereas most successful candidates in the national 
election were affiliated with the Social Action and the Thai Nation parties, the majority 
of candidates in the subsequent local election refused to be named as party members. 
Local candidates won without any assistance from national parties; the latter were 
barely visible on the local political scene (Murashima, 1987, 363-385). 
Worse, local strongmen and local elites became an indispensible part of the 
electoral machinery, without whom parties might have little chance of success. 
Businessmen who joined the 1979 election did not have the advantages that the former 
bureaucrats and military men-turned-politicians used to enjoy. In the earlier elections, 
when many candidates came from the military and the bureaucracy, they could use 
state agencies to help them canvass for votes, not to mention the fact that the public 
had known them through their official careers (Ockey, 2004, p. 24).  By contrast, the 
new office-seekers of the 1979 election needed to secure the allegiance of local patrons 
who would carry out the task of mobilizing local voters (Somrudee, 1993, 167-182). With 
increasing demands for their support, local bosses could then ask for higher prices. 
Elections ineluctably became more expensive. Candidates found themselves caught 
between wealthy party bosses who financially supported their campaigns and local 
bosses who mediated their relations with the voters. As clientelistic networks became 
stronger and more effective, the chance to develop organized electoral machinery 
became increasingly slender (Ockey, 2004, pp.32-37).  
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5.6 Concluding remarks 
Two prominent features characterized parties in these epic years. First, emerging 
parties were unable to incorporate new office-seekers and rural voters into the political 
system. The shortage of preexisting organizations put parties in a disadvantageous 
position in their relations with both office-seekers and voters. Secondly and 
consequentially, office-seekers built clientelistic networks to canvass for votes in the 
new and mostly rural constituencies. Over time, party apparatuses were reoriented to 
use rents to recruit local supporters and strengthen the electoral bases of individual 
politicians to the extent that by the end of the 1970s there was no central leadership 
structure able to supervising activities of parties as a whole. Resulting web-like parties 
developed from the sum of multiple political networks, each of which was linked to 
different candidates. Such web-like parties would render the party system unstable, 
since politicians, with support from their own networks, could afford to ally and 
separate from their political fellows whenever they felt the need to do so. 
Democratic transition is the juncture when both the opposition and the citizens 
are politically incorporated into the political system. Public competition opens the 
regime to anybody who wishes to seek power and the people gain the right to 
participate in politics through the ballot box. This dual process begins when free and fair 
elections with universal suffrage become the only method to form government (Dahl, 
1971, pp.20-25). With elections, political parties play a critical role, which includes 
coordinating office-seekers, connecting candidates with voters and channeling social 
interests into government’s decision-making. Political parties thus become means by 
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which these factions are politically incorporated into the system. In this light, the period 
from 1969 to 1979 was a critical juncture in Thai politics. Yet, with regards the role of 
parties in democratic transition, the country's parties failed to play the channeling 
function to incorporate office-seekers and voters into the political system smoothly. As 
was discussion in Chapter 2, events and actions in the critical juncture set the wheels in 
motion, shaping the courses of actions in the following period. The fact that parties 
failed at the incorporation tasks that were expected of them during the 1969-1979 
critical juncture had important implications for the fate of parties and the party system 
in the subsequent years.  
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Chapter Six: Concluding Remarks 
 
This thesis analyzed the historical development of the Thai party system in 
pursuit of two aims– to analyze the historical roots of the current disarray of the Thai 
party system and to use this analysis to illustrate how feedback mechanisms sustain the 
influence of political failures in the first party system (1945-1948) on the party system 
that reemerged out of political liberalization starting from 1969.  
I began by situating the Thai party system in the literature on party system 
institutionalization. The latter, I argued, overlooked the different contexts of 
democratization and party building in developed and developing democracies. 
Accordingly, Chapter Two proposed a novel framework that would hinge on analyzing 
the initial conditions of party systems to elucidate their subsequent development. This 
framework that marries path-dependency with the theories on parties and party 
systems of Lipset and Rokkan (1967), Sartori (1976) and Aldrich (1995) underlines 
several main parameters. They include party formation, expectations of voters and 
coordination among office-seekers. The centerpiece of my historical argument was that 
the existence or absence of organizations prior to the first competitive elections with 
universal suffrage would generate different kinds of voting expectations, incentives and 
bargaining power among voters, office-seekers and central party leadership. This 
precondition could ease or hamper coordination among office-seekers to pool resources 
and efforts to sustain the parties. More importantly, the failure or success in forming 
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and sustaining parties in these first elections would trigger either positive or negative 
feedback mechanisms that could help party systems consolidate or not.  
I applied this path-dependent framework to the Thai case in Chapters Three to 
Five. Chapter Three provided the historical backdrop from which the first party system 
(1945-1948) arose. Chapter Four presented an elaborate account of party politics during 
this same period. I posited that the results of party formation of these years would have 
perplexing impacts on future party system development. If it had been successful, the 
coup against the elected government would not have occurred so easily. Even if the 
coup had been ineluctable, its effects on an immature party system would have differed 
from those on a mature one. The timing of the coup and of the collapse of the first party 
system was thus critical. I found that the confluence of three occurrences, namely, the 
severe competition among the then political parties, Phibun’s acquittal of war crimes 
and the shifts in world affairs, accounted for the first party system's collapse.  The 
Democrats unintentionally catalyzed the convergence of these events. 
Chapter Five sought to examine the re-emergence of parties after a twenty-year 
disruption of military rule. Although elections resumed in 1969 under Thanom's 
liberalization, parties have since struggled in vain to flourish. With poor party 
reputations and no functional electoral machinery, the central party leadership has had 
to buy affiliation of office-seekers and rely on them to canvass for votes in local 
constituencies. The use of rents has done little to cement partisanship. Office-seekers 
have sold their allegiance to whichever party that could offer them higher material 
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benefits. Votes for parties have swung each election, as electoral support bases belong 
to free-floating politicians with direct contact with voters. The legacies presented in 
Chapter Five supported my argument in Chapter Two that without pre-existing party 
organizations, the party system would face tremendous obstacles in consolidating. 
My empirical chapters illustrated how a kind of feedback mechanism was 
triggered and how it sustained certain political patterns and practices over time. 
Specifically in the Thai case, the negative feedback carried forth the initial atomization 
of the party system. To be sure, more cases are needed to validate my theoretical 
framework, particularly comparative studies between cases with and those without pre-
existing party organizations; this remains beyond the scope of this study. Research on 
the Thai party system would also be more complete with a detailed analysis of post-
1979 party politics to evaluate the strength of historical legacies with the passing of 
time. A comparative study or an extended study of the Thai case may inform future 
research. 
That said, this study presents useful implications. First, it sheds light on the 
relationship between institutional and socio-economic changes. The Thai case reaffirms 
the non-linear effects of socio-economic factors on political institutions. Thailand has 
developed economically and socially over the years. Since the 1960s, industrialization 
has elevated living standards and has brought about a sizeable number of bourgeoisie, 
proletariats, and between them the middle class. Waves of social change have not only 
washed over Bangkok but also gradually has touched other regions, although unevenly. 
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The “Red Shirts” movement57 is reminiscent of the student movements in 1973 and 
1976 and the middle-class movement in 1992 against the military. It differs from the 
previous movements merely in the fact that rural dwellers and non-Bangkokians have 
led the protests this time. However, despite these sea changes in society, political 
institutions remain intact. While other studies have extensively discussed the incessant 
interventions of the monarchy and the military, my analysis adds another instance of 
the resistance to reform in Thai politics, that is, the slow responses of Thai parties to 
socio-economic changes. An historical account of the first party system, through the 
1970s and until today, unveils tried-and-true campaign tactics, and static patterns of 
political competition among parties. Parties have been habituated to making personal 
attacks and to conspiring with extra-parliamentary forces to defeat competitors. Office-
seekers have learned from past practices and have followed these political norms; 
worse, they have vested interests in keeping parties weak.   
Second, this thesis relates to the ongoing debates about democratization in 
Thailand. Many studies have noted the country's unfinished democratic transition. The 
demise of military regimes, years of struggle to institutionalise elections and pass 
different constitutions, let alone changes to each one, have resulted in the so-called 
“Thai-style democracy,” obfuscating the coexistence of elected institutions and the 
reserved authority for non-elected institutions. That is, elected parties govern, while the 
                                                          
57
 Reacting the 2006 coup, Thaksin’s supporters formed the United Front for Democracy Against 
Dictatorship (UDD) group, who are commonly called Red Shirts. The Red Shirts have organized anti-coup 
protests in Bangkok since late 2008; and the largest of them occurred in April 2009 and from March to 
May 2010. Most of the Red Shirts are reported to be rural dwellers and rural migrants to Bangkok 
(Ferrara, 2011, chapter 5). 
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monarchy and the military set the political rules. Political stability rests upon their 
behind-the-scenes negotiations and their commitment to that political order. Worse, 
non-elected institutions--the monarchy and the military--on the contrary, propound that 
they are “democratic” and “representative” leaders of the country (Connors, 2007). 
Chapters Four and Five expounded the failures of parties to take the lead in the 
democratization process. For the first time (1945-1948), it was their miscalculations that 
culminated in the return of the military, and under the auspices of three consecutive 
military leaders Phibun, Sarit and Thanom, the state-led “democracy-building” projects 
arose (Connors, 2007, chapter four). For the second time (1969-1979), it was the 
incapacity of parties and their strategies for survival that rendered them immobilized 
amid waves of student protests and pitched political battles between the left and the 
right. The monarchy, rather than political parties, consequently emerged as an agent of 
reconciliation and representative of national interests. Furthermore, early encounters 
with parties and elections left people so dissatisfied that they lost trust in the 
supposedly procedural democracy.  By providing extensive accounts on Thai parties over 
time, this thesis brings a new perspective on the problem by placing political parties at 
the forefront of explanations of abortive democratization in Thailand.   
Finally, returning to current affairs, findings of this thesis shed instructive light on 
the election of 3 July 2011 and the years to come in Thai politics. Will the parties that 
won on the latest contest spearhead political reform? Will the country proceed towards 
a deeper and more consolidated democracy?  
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Pessimistically, post-election politics show a recurrence of old stories, despite a 
seemingly altered power structure in the party system. The Phuea Thai won a majority 
of 265 out of 500 parliamentary seats. Meanwhile, the incumbent Democrats finished 
second with 115, and eight other parties shared a handful of seats. Coupled with 
outcomes of the past few elections,58 a two-party system has appeared to crystallize. 
Reality is messier than electoral figures, however. No sooner than the electoral results 
were officially announced did the Democrats replay their familiar tactics – denouncing 
the winners and suing to disband them (BKP, 8 July, 2011).59 Even without the 
Democrats’ hostility, the Phuea Thai has had its own problems.  Its central leadership is 
torn by the demands of grassroots supporters in the Red Shirts movement, on one side, 
and of their party members and political allies, on the other. While the Red Shirts, who 
largely helped the Phuea Thai to earn votes from the poor and the peasants, aim for 
political reform, party members are comfortable with the status quo as long as their 
cabinet seats are secured (“Reds pile pressure on Phuea Thai,” BKP, 8 July, 2011). The 
winning coalition faces a repeat of the 1970s, when weak parties were swamped with 
conflicts when trying to incorporate both grassroots movements and elite groups.  
While the Phuea Thai’s party executive may have more leverage in commanding their 
members than the Democrats or the Social Action Party did in 1975 and 1976 because 
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 See footnote 2 
59
 Democrats: Ban Phuea Thai, on 8 July, 2011, retrieved from 
http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/politics/246098/thailand-democrats-seek-ban-on-thaksin-party on 
12 July, 2011 
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of a clear electoral majority from the party-list,60, the fact that the current executive 
committee is new and appreciably dependent on a fugitive leader – Thaksin -- may 
undermine its decision-making power and authority over its members. Given our 
understanding of historical patterns, as presented in this thesis, one may expect that 
parties will fall victim to their own competition and internal bickering before the military 
"discovers" reasons to intervene. One can argue that  we that now observing now a 
well-rehearsed step along a well-trodden path, where the party system oscillates back 
and forth from the original equilibrium marked by atomization and disarray. 
Alternatively, one may contend that historical legacies may erode and an original 
equilibrium may be replaced under different socio-political conditions.  My historical 
framework does not dismiss this possibility. Indeed, the critical juncture concept 
embraces the possibility of change. As defined in Chapter One, a critical juncture is 
opened when there are urges to make crucial decisions and when opportunities arise for 
changes. Accordingly, political struggles since 2006 have instigated another critical 
juncture in Thai politics. The incensed Red Shirts have waged civil strife to challenge the 
supremacy of the unelected, and to demand their interests to be represented and their 
votes to be honored, as their electoral choices had repeatedly been nullified by the coup 
and the two following judicial decisions. As the underdog dared to strive against elite-
led, Thai-style democracy, the establishment wasted no time in fortifying its political 
position. The coalition among the royalists, the Democrat government and the military 
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 In 1975 and 1976 elections, there was no party-list vote, so parties completely owed their positions to 
their members’ victories in local constituencies. In the last election, 125 out of 500 seats were voted by 
party-lists, and the Phuea Thai obtained 61 among these.   
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launched bloody crackdowns on the Red Shirts, killing more than ninety people, and 
crudely employed the lèse-majesté laws to silence criticism.61 Altogether, these 
unresolved and violent confrontations demonstrated that existing political institutions 
can no longer ably contain such conflict. These factors may force a revamping of the 
institutional landscape.  
In short, the 2006 coup and its aftermath have unleashed long suppressed 
tension. The physically weak monarch can hardly play the mediating role again; his 
future successor – the crown prince – is a mere shadow with little personal legitimacy.  
Serious change is a matter of time.  What kind of change--that remains to be seen. The 
prospect for the Thai party system to consolidate and the chance for Thailand to achieve 
a more meaningful democracy hinge upon both the Phuea Thai’s leadership and on the 
crucial consensus of other parties that they must cooperate in order to protect and 
nurture the electoral process for their long-term collective interests, rather than for 
short-term gain. 
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 Public media counted that there were at least ninety-one deaths and more than 1,800 wounded after 
two months of protests in 2010. Reclaiming the truth in Thailand, Reuters, 12 February, 2011, retrieved 
from http://blogs.reuters.com/andrew-marshall/2011/02/13/reclaiming-the-truth-in-thailand/ on 15 July 
2011. 
Regarding the lèse-majesté laws, in 2004, there were only four lèse-majesté cases; the number of lèse-
majesté cases had increased since 2007 and reached its recorded hike in 2009, under the Democrat 
government, with 164 cases. Marwaan Macan-Markar, Inter Press Service, 14 May, 2010, retrieved from 
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